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Abstract
An ongoing debate in the corporate finance world concerns the question of a firm's
optimal capital structure. More specifically, is there a way of dividing a firm's capital into
debt and equity so as to maximize the value of the firm? From a practical standpoint, this
question is of utmost importance for corporate financial officers. Yet, the academic
literature has not been very helpful to provide clear guidance on practical issues.
Except for a few theoretical models, there is a lack of literature concernmg how
companies should decide their leverage ratios in practice. These models are unfortunately
not applicable in real practice because of their inability to provide managers with a
precise optimal leverage level. The purpose of this study concerns the practical matter of
deciding the appropriate capital structure and the possibility of improvement for the
companies. Specifically: How do the case companies decide their capital structure? Are
their current capital stmctures optimal or is there room for improvement? To be able to
examine these questions it was necessary to investigate companies that are as comparable
as possible within the same industry.
Different industries were identified based on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange industry
classification and were analyzed for comparability issues. The real estate industry was
found to experiences very similar business and has an opportunity to take more debt due
to the nature of its asset structure. Three companies were selected from the property
segment of the real estate industry based on their leverage ratios and companies with
highest, medium, and lowest leverages in the industry were selected. Gold-edge was
found to be the highest levered company in the industry, while Samrand and Putprop were
found to be average and least levered in the industry respectively. The findings indicate
that none of the companies uses capital structure models when deciding their capital
structure. The case companies' capital structure indicates that Gold-edge's current capital
structure is considered as close to optimal as possible while Putprop and Samrand current
capital structure are not optimal and there is room for improvement.
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CHAPTER ONE: CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS IN PRACTICE
I.INTRODUCTION
Corporate capital structure and the decisions made by companies in structuring their
capital is the core concept to be examined in this case study. Furthermore, the impact of
capital structure decisions will be questioned in order to ascertain their validity and long-
term effects on the value offirm.
1.1 Background of the study
Modem corporate finance theory was born with the publication in 1958 of Modigliani and
Miller's theoretical model about corporate capital structure. They showed that, in a capital
market free of taxes, transaction costs, and other fictions, the choice of the firm's capital
structure could not affect its capital valuation.
Many of the capital structure studies during past forty years have involved examining how
robust the model is to more realistic assumptions regarding market fictions and
information sets available to managers and shareholders. Asymmetrical information
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) between managers and outside investors led to the Pecking
Order Model. The model predicts that firms will always choose the least expensive
method for their financing needs and a financial hierarchy descends from internal funds to
debt, to external equity. The development of agency theory in 1980's, coupled with
detailed research into the extent and effect of bankruptcy costs during 1980's, led to a yet
more detailed view of the utility of the basic M & M capital structure theory.
Finally, cross cultural examination of observed capital structure patterns in different
countries has led to the current view that corporations act as if there is a unique capital
structure for individual firms. This results from a trade off between the tax benefits of
increasing leverage and increasing agency and financial distress costs that high debt
entails.
The fact that there appears to be an optimal capital structure for each individual firm is
very interesting, because a firm's value depends to a large extent on its capital structure.
Consequently, this motivates financial managers to revise capital structures for their
companies to create more value.
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1.2 Problem discussion
An ongoing debate in the corporate finance world concerns the question of a firm's
optimal capital structure. More specifically, is there a way of dividing a firm's capital into
debt and equity so as to maximize the value of the firm? From a practical standpoint, this
question is of utmost importance for corporate financial officers, as was demonstrated in
the survey results of Graham and Harvey (2001). Yet, the academic literature has not been
very helpful to provide clear guidance on practical issues.
Substantial portions of the literature concerning capital structure have dealt with issues
regarding the leverage ratios, which have been analyzed in different ways. This research
also dealt with these ratios from an entirely different angle. Except for a few theoretical
models, there is a lack of literature concerning how companies should decide their
leverage ratios in practice. These models are unfortunately not applicable in real practice
because of their inability to provide managers with a precise optimal leverage level. It is
therefore important to investigate how companies determine their capital structure due to
the lack ofliterature within the area. Some questions beg asking in this connection:
• Could it be that companies have developed their own models?
• Is the decision process different between companies within the same industry?
• Does the highest levered company have a totally different procedure from the
lowest levered company?
It is suspected that capital structure for some companies are not optimal and there are
possibilities for improvement. To be able to examine this kind of question we need to
investigate companies that are as comparable as possible within the same industry. I have
examined all the industries in South Africa and come to the conclusion that the real
estates industry suits this study. The reason for this is that real estates industry
experiences very similar business and has an opportunity to take more debt due to the
nature of its asset structure.
1.3 Problem and Purpose
The purpose of this study is to solve the questions stated below. These questions are
formulated on the basis of the problem discussion and concern the practical matter of




How do the case companies decide their capital structure?
Are their current capital structures optimal or is there room for improvement?
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1.4 Contribution
Except for inapplicable theoretical models, there is an acute lack of literature concerning
how companies should act when determining their capital structure. This research aims to
shed new light on how companies decide on their capital structure and will complement
existing studies in the area of capital structure decisions. The study also investigates how
the companies could improve their current capital structure by combining existing
theoretical models and empirical findings.
1.5 Delimitation
The study involves only three property companies in the real estates industry and the data
employed in this study are only for the year 2001. This may pose the question of
representivity and cast doubt on the accuracy of the information. The inability to obtain
information on some companies in this study may have impact on the results.
1.6 Dispositions.
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters:
1) Introduction
2) Methodology
3) Theoretical frame work
4) The real estate industry
5) The case of Putprop
6) The case of Gold-edge
7) The case of Samrand
8) Overall conclusion
Chapter Two describes tht( research methodology used. It explains the data collection
methods and the research approach and discusses the reliability and validity issues of the
study. Definitions and formula of key variables found in this dissertation are also
presented in this section.
Chapter Three discusses different capital structure theories, models, and empirical
findings of the prior researchers.
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Chapter Four examines key variables that are important to the real estate companies. The
industry leverage pattern is presented and is discussed in conjunction with the empirical
pattern concerning capital structure.
Chapter Five, Six and Seven consists of answers to the research question, an analysis of
the research results and the conclusion thereto.
Chapter Eight presents the overall conclusion and suggestion for further research in the
area of corporate capital structure.
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2 CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to answer the question stated in 1.3, various types ofresearch were considered.
Explanation of each approach will be given as well as the motivation for selecting any
particular approach.
2.1 Scientific approach
A study can either be deductive or inductive or can be a combination of two approaches.
The deductive approach is preferred when an issue can be derived from theory and that
theory then forms the basis for the empirical study. On the other hand, the inductive way
is preferred when the problem issue has no connection to any kind of theory. In this case,
the facts speak for themselves and one seeks regularity in events Halverson, (1992). This
study used both the deductive and in?uctive approaches because the first question is
inductive in nature and it does not rely on the theory. The second question is however of a
deductive nature since the answer to it could be derived from a theory or a theoretical
model.
2.2.Research design
According to Patel and Davidson (1994) every study has a research design. The design of
the research functions as the basis for how the process will proceed and in what form the
report will be presented. The case study research strategy is preferred when a "how" or
"why" question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the
investigator has little or no control. Moreover, the case study is advantageous when the
purpose of the research is to generalize in an analytical way (Yin, 1994). In this study, a
case study approach was used since the focus is on contemporary events and their impact
on the future capital structure. To carry out this study in an effective manner, a
comprehensive literature review was undertaken to become acquainted with theories and
the latest empirical findings in the area. An industry analysis was conducted in order to
seek the key patterns regarding leverage ratios and interviews were also carried out with
selected respondents. These information sources and the annual reports of the respective
companies formed the basis for the case analysis.
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2.2.1. Case study design
Four basic research designs can be distinguished namely:
• a single case
• a multiple case
• a holistic case, and
• an embedded case
A single case design is advantageous when the case represents the critical test of an
existing, well-formulated theory; when it represents a rare or unique event or when it fills
a revelatory purpose. Multiple case designs are used when the same study contains more
than one single case. On the other hand, the embedded design is preferred when the same
case study involves more than one unit of analysis if only one unit of analysis is examined
the holistic design is used. The Multiple case study design with a holistic view was
chosen because it has one distinct advantage in comparison with a single case design: the
evidence from multiple cases is often considered more interesting, and overall study is
therefore regarded as being more solid than the single case design and the theoretical
framework becomes the vehicle for generalizing about the new cases Yin, (1994).
2.3.The quality of research design




• external, validity, and
• reliability.
2.3.1 Construct validity.
According to Yin (1994), there are three methods by which to increase the construct
validity. The first method is the use of multiple sources of evidenct? The second method
is to establish a chain of evidence, which is also relevant during data collection. The third
method is to have the draft case study report reviewed by key informants. In order to
ensure the construct validity in this study, multiple sources of evidence were used. These
include interviews, annual reports of case companies, and capital structure theories. The
chain of evidence was also established through an analysis of the real estate industry and




Internal validity exists when the instrument used in a study measures what it is supposed
to measure. To test for internal validity, a pilot study of preliminary questionnaires was
carried out before interviews were held and adjustments were incorporated. Only audited
financial statements were used and recalculations were done where necessary to insure
consistency and accuracy. The theory also suggests that an explanation building
procedure is appropriate for exploratory studies because in most existing case studies
explanation building occurred in narrative forn1 and such narrative form cannot be precise
(Yin 1994). Yin further suggests that good case studies are the ones in which explanations
have reflected some theoretical significant proposition. In this case study, reference is
made to capital structure theory throughout the analysis section. It is proposed that this
will increase the internal/validity.
2.3.3 External validity
The examination of multiple cases is a common strategy used to increase external
validity. In this study, three companies with different leverage levels were analysed and
comparisons were made between them. Putprop was selected which is the lowest levered
company in the industry, Samrand, averagely levered and Gold-edge, the highest levered
in the industry.
2.3.4 Reliability
To secure the reliability of this case study, all the data was interpreted cautiously
throughout the research process. Data from different sources was compared in order to
attain the highest possible reliability. In order to secure the reliability of interviews, the
respondents were selected according to their level of knowledge of company's capital
structure.
2.4 Sample selection
The companies used in the study, were selected based on the following criteria:
• must be from the same industry
• must have no restriction on leverage level
• must have asset structure that is easily valued by the market, and
• must be as comparable as possible in terms of operating environment.
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Different industries were identified based on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange industry
classification and were analysed for comparability issues. Real estate industry shows the
most similarity compared to other industries, it also presents asset structure that is easily
valued by the market. When a larger fraction of firm's assets is tangible, these assets can
serve as collateral, which diminishes the risk to the lender of suffering the agency cost of
debt. The liquidation value of the firm's assets will also be higher with tangible assets,
which will decrease the possibility of mispricing in the event of bankruptcy and make the
lender more willing to grant the loans (Rajan and Zingales, 1994). Given this ability of
companies in the real estates industry to raise more debt, it would be interesting to
examine how these companies decide how much debt should be used in their capital
structure.
Real estate industry companies were categorized according to whether they are Property
Unit Trusts, Property Loan Stocks or Property Companies. Property Unit Trusts are
governed by Unit Trust Body and have restriction on their capital structure i.e. they have a
limit on the debt ratio in their capital structure. For this reason the Unit Trust companies
were eliminated in the case study. The Property Loan Stocks and Property Companies
have no restrictions on their capital structures and could be included in the case study.
However, Property Loan Stock was also eliminated based on the fact that the companies
that satisfied the leverage criteria were not ready for the case study.
Three companies were selected from the property segment of the real estate industry
based on their leverage ratios and companies with highest, medium, and lowest leverages
in the industry were selected. Gold-edge was found to be the highest levered company in
the industry, while Samrand and Putprop were found to be average and least levered in
the industry respectively refer Appendix VI, page 99
The rationale for these interval leverage ratios is that different information on capital
structure decisions might be obtained (Harris and Raviv, 1991) noted that it is generally
accepted that firms in a given industry will have similar leverage ratios while leverage
ratios vary across industries.
2.5 Data collections
2.5.1 Secondary data
Secondary data can be divided into two categories, depending on whether it is collected
from internal or external sources. Internal data comes from within the organization while
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external data comes from outside the organization (Holme & Solvang, 1991). The
secondary data in this research consisted of external data gathered from university of
Natal Library; national and international interlibrary data; academics, as well as
organizational journals and the Internet. An extensive review of the past and present
research on this topic was conducted to establish the framework of the new study, to set
objectives and to gain a through knowledge of the given topic. Thereafter, the study
focused primarily on the collection of the data.
2.5.2 Primary data
One of the most important sources of case study data was the interview. Interviews can be
of a very different nature, depending on what suits the purposes of the research (Holme
&Solvang, 1991). The communication-based method of data collection has been used to
set up a formal interview with the selected personnel of the case companies. The initial
encounter could be defined as an "experience survey", the objective of the survey was to:
• ascertain the nature of corporate preference in raising new funds
• to establish the relative importance of various capital structures input which
influences financing decisions
• to ascertain the relative impoitance of vanous financial planning principles
governing their financing decisions
• the extent to which the debt ratios are dependent on the performances
characteristics of their firm as perceived by managers
• discuss and record the current procedures used by the companies in establishing
optimal capital structure
The first four questions intended to ascertain the basic financing philosophy (covered in
the first four points above) of the case companies, and fifth question intended to discuss
and record the current procedures used by the companies in establishing optimal capital
structure (covered in the fifth point above), refer Appendix vii)
2.6 Data Analysis Technique
2.6.1 Within case analysis
Company annual reports and interview answers were analysed to identifY any pattern
within the firm. Preparation of a case write-up for each company, categorization of
interview questions and answers and examination of the data from within (annual reports)
for similarities and differences was conducted.
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2.6.2. Cross-case analysis
The analysis also involved an examination of pairs of cases, categorizing the similarities
and differences in each pair, this was followed by an examination of similar pairs for
differences, and dissimilar pairs for similarities between them. This process sought to
identify patterns or any conflicting evidence that would result in a follow up focused
interview to confirm or correct the initial data. In this way evidence could be linked to the
findings and relationships could be established in answer to research questions.
2.7 Definitions of key variables
Key variables have been identified as those factors that could be used to predict the real
estate industry capital structure pattern. For the purpose of this study these variable are:
interest coverage ratio, leverage ratios, equity ratios (equity/debt), debt ratios
(debt/equity), asset beta, equity beta and financial beta.
2.7.1 Interest coverage ratio
The interest coverage ratio measures the firm's ability to make contractual interest
payment. The higher the value of this ratio, the better able the firm will be able to fulfill
its interest obligations. The interest coverage formula is given as follows:
Earning before interest and taxes
Interest coverage ratio=
Interest charges
2. 7.2 Leverage ratio
Leverage ratio measures the proportional of total assets financed by the firm's creditors.
The higher the ratio, the greater the amount of external money being used to generate
profits. There are different approaches for the calculation of leverage ratio, however, the
formula that has been used in this dissertation is given as follows:
Total debt
Leverage ratio= --------------
Total debt +Shareholders' fund
2.7.3 Debt/Equity ratio (Debt ratio)
Debt/Equity ratio measures the proportion of total equity financed by firm's creditors. The
higher the ratio, the greater the amount of the external money being used to generate
profits. The formula used in this dissertation is given as follows:
Debt/Equi.ty ratio= Total debt
Total equity
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2.7.4 Equity/debt ratio (Equity ratio)
Equity/Debt ratio measures the extent to which the total equity covers the total debt. The
higher the ratio the greater the amount of shareholders' money being used to generate
profit. Equity ratio is calculated as follows:
Equity Debt ratio=
2. 7.5 Asset beta
Total equity
Total debt
The firm's asset beta measures the systematic risk of the firm's asset and it is sometimes
called unlevered beta because it is the beta that the share would have if the firm had no
debt. Asset beta (unlevered beta) is given by the formula as follows:




Ifbeta of debt, f3o. is assumed to be zero, then:
Asset beta = E x (f3E)
D (1-Tc) +E
2. 7.6 Equity beta
Equity beta is composed ofjinancial beta and asset or business beta and can be derived
from asset beta as follows:
f3E = WA) x 1 +D/E (1-Tc).
Thus, the equity beta, WE), equals the asset beta, WA), multiplied by equity multiplier,
(l + DIE (l-Tc)(Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 1993).
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2. 7. 7 Financial beta
The finn's financial beta depends on its financial policy and measures the financial risk of
the equity. Financial beta can be obtained by subtracting asset beta (unlevered beta) from
equity beta (total risk) as follows:
Financial beta = Equity beta - Asset beta = (f)E) -(f3A)
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3 CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theories and empirical findings concerning capital structure will be presented in this
chapter. This knowledge is necessary in order to understand the case study analysis.
3.1 Modigliani and Miller's propositions
3.1.1 M & M Proposition I with no taxes
In 1958, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller published their first article concerning
capital structure. They had a convincing argument that a firm cannot change the total
value of the outstanding securities by changing the proportion of its capital structure. The
value of the firm will be the same, regardless of which type of capital structure is chosen.
This is a strong argument where the authors explicitly or implicitly assume that:
• capital market are frictionless: the securities can be purchased and sold costless
and instantaneously;
• individuals can borrow and lend at the risk free rate;
• corporation can issue only two types of securities, being risky equity and risk-free
debt;
• all corporations are assumed to be of the same risk class;
• there are no corporate or personal taxes;
• there is no growth and all cash flow is perpetuities.
• the corporate lender and the public have the same information, and there are no
signalling opportunities; and
• there are no agency costs and managers always maximize shareholders' wealth.
When all assumptions are fulfilled, equation 3.1 holds.
Equation 3.1
VL=Vu
VL=value of levered firm
Vu=value of unlevered firm
This model is called M&M proposition I, where the value of unlevered firm is the same as
the value of levered firm. This means that the value of any firm is independent of its
capital structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). At first, with all the assumptions, the
model seem unrealistic, but even when some of the assumptions are relaxed the argument
still holds.
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Proposition I is based on the fact that if levered firms are priced too high, rational
investors will simply borrow on personal accounts to buy shares in unlevered firms. As
long as individuals borrow and lend on the same terms as the firm, they can duplicate the
effect of corporate leverage on their own. This is commonly referred to as home-made
leverage. The home-made findings are considered the starting point of modem managerial
finance and it is one of the most important findings in the ar\?a of corporate finance (Ross
Westfield and Jaffe, 1993).
3.1.2 M&Mproposition II with no taxes
Since levered equity has greater risk, it should have greater expected returns as
compensation. This type of reasoning led to the development of M&M proposition H.
Modigliani and Miller argued that the expected return on equity is positively related to
leverage, because the risk of equity increases with leverage. To develop this proposition,
weighted average cost of capital is used, which is written as:
rWACC= D/D+E *rD + E/D+E *rE. If the cost of capital for an all equity firm can be defined as
rA, then rWACC must always be equal to rA in a world with out taxes, refer equation 3.2
below:
Equation 3.2
rWACC=rA= D/D+E *rD +E/D+E *rE.
D and E represent the firm's debt and equity respectively, and the return on asset (rA) is a
constant, regardless of capital structure. By rearranging the terms, the M&M Proposition
H is obtained, refer equation 3.3 below:
Equation 3.3
rE=rA+ DIE * rA- rD
Since we know that the (rA ) is constant for any capital structure, and thus the return on
debt (rD ) is assumed to be constant, we can calculate the return on equity (rE) for
different kinds of capital structures. The larger the amount of debt, the larger the required
return on equity.
We know from Proposition I that the company's WACC (rA) is constant, and the changing
capital structure cannot affect its value. We also know that, according to Proposition H,
the rate of return on equity increases as leverage increases. Although these appear to
contradict each other, what happens is that the risk increases as leverage increases. When
the firm moves from an unlevered structure to a levered structure, the opening income is
divided into smaller amounts of outstanding shares, which results in larger rE. rE has
increased, but risk (beta) has also increased (Modigliani & Miller, 1958)
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Figure 3.1 shows that rE is not important when determining an optimal capital structure. rE
can always be increased by borrowing, but the increase in rE is offset by the risk. WACC
remains constant even when firms change their capital structure and consequently they are
not better off with leverage (this statement holds in a world with no taxes).
Figure 3.1 M& MProposition 11 with no taxes
~--------------------'WACC
1-----------------------. ro
Source: Copeland and Weston (1992)
M & M proposition 1I concludes that changing from equity to debt that seems to be
cheaper, cannot reduce the overall cost of capital. As the firm adds debt, the remaining
equity becomes more risky and the cost of equity increases. The increase in the cost of
equity capital is offset by the larger proportion financed by low-cost debt. The value of
the firm and the firm's overall cost is invariable to leverage, which is shown by a constant
WACC.
3.1.3 M & M Proposition I, with taxes
One of the more critical assumptions in M & M Proposition I and II is that there are no
taxes. This assumption is not realistic, since every country taxes company income.
Governments have chosen to "subsidize" interest payment to providers of debt capital,
which means that debt financing is tax deductible. In other words, the levered company
pays less tax than an all-equity company does.
The value of the levered firm is equal to the value of unlevered firm plus the present value




When the assumption of taxes is relaxed, the market value of the company increases by
taking on more risk-free debt. Consequently the company should take on 100% debt to
optimize company value. This is M & M Proposition I with taxes (Modigliani and Miller,
1963).
3.1.4 M & M Proposition 11, with taxes
The M & M Proposition 11 with no taxes shows a positive relationship between the
expected return on equity and leverage. The same intuition holds when we add corporate
taxes, as seen in equation 3.5:
Equation 3.5
rE = rA +D/E * (I-Tc) * (rA -ro)
The WACC, including taxes, is seen in equation 3.6:
Equation 3.6
WACC= DID+E *ro (1-Tc) + EID +E *rE
Figure 3.2 shows that higher leverage level provides the firm with a lower WACC when
corporate taxes exist. This can be compared to Figure 3.1 where WACC is constant even
when leverage is increased. This suggests that the firm's value will increase with higher
leverage since WACC will decrease, assuming that corporate taxes exist. It shows that the
larger the amount of debt, the higher the value of the firm, which implies that 100% debt
financing should be implemented (Copeland and Weston, 1992).
Figure 3.2 M&MProposition /I, with taxes
WACC
Source: Copeland and Weston (1992)
It is important to keep in mind the restrictive assumptions that must be met for the M & M
proposition with taxes to hold. The most important assumption is that it ignores
bankruptcy costs, which have been found to exist in reality.
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3.2 THEORETICAL MODELS
The M & M propositions have created a starting point for capital structure theory and
today there are three models that have been incorporated into the mainstream of corporate
finance. The Trade Off Model, Pecking Order Hypothesis and the Signaling Hypothesis
try to explain observed patterns, they do not calculate an optimal capital structure level
(Copeland and Weston, 1992)
3.2.1 The Trade OffModel.
According to Modigliani and Miller (1963), firms would prefer to be 100% debt financed
in order to be able to take full advantage of the tax shield. However, 100% debt financing
is not what occurs in the real world due to the fact that there is danger of bankruptcy. In
the M & M proposition with taxes it is assumed that there are no bankruptcy costs. Instead
the optimal capital structure is found at the trade off point where the gain from taking
additional debt is offset by the extra cost incurred of financial distress as can be seen in
Figure 3.3.






V = value of the firm
Vu = value of unlevered firm
PVT = present value oftax deductible value
PVFD = present value of the risk for financial distress.
D/V* = Firm's optimal capital structure
The upper curve in Figure 3.3 shows the value of the company without considering the
cost of financial distress. When financial distress is taken into account and deducted from
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the upper curve, we arrive at the lower curve. The optimal capital structure occurs where
the lower curve has its highest point.
3.2.1.1 Financial distress
Debt provides tax benefits to the firm, but also puts pressure on the firm, since interest
and principle payment are obligations, according to the Trade Off Model. The closer the
firm is to bankruptcy, the larger the financial distress. The ultimate cost of financial
distress is bankruptcy, where ownership of the firm's assets is legally transferred from the
stockholders to the bondholders (Haugen and Senbet, 1978).
The possibility of bankruptcy cost has a negative effect on the value of the firm. However,
it is not the risk of bankruptcy itself that lowers the value, rather the costs associated with
it. The costs associated with bankruptcy are categorized as direct and indirect financial
distress costs.
Direct costs can be seen as out of pocket cash expenses, which are directly related to the
filing of bankruptcy and the action of bankruptcy. Examples of direct costs are the fees
for lawyers, investment bankers, administrative fees, and the value of managerial time
spent in administering the bankruptcy (Haugen and Senbet, 1978). In 1984, Altman
estimated the direct costs of financial distress to be 3.1 % of the firm value. In a study of
the direct financial distress costs of 20 railroad bankruptcies, Warner (1997) found that
net financial distress were, on average, 1 percent of the market value of the firm seven
years before bankruptcy and were somewhat higher percentages as bankruptcy
approached. For example, this rose to 2.5 percent of the market value of the firm three
years before bankruptcy.
Indirect costs are expenses or economic losses that result from bankruptcy but are not
cash expenses of the process itself. Examples of such costs are, lost sales during and after
bankruptcy, diversion of management time when bankruptcy is underway, and loss of key
employees after the firm goes bankrupt. (Titman, 1984) found that sales would frequently
be lost because of the customers' fear of impaired service and loss of trust in the
company.
In 1984 Altman conducted a study with a sample of 19 firms: and 12 retailers and 7
industries that all filed for bankruptcy between 1970 and 1978. He found the arithmetic
indirect financial distress costs to be 10,5% of a firm value. Altman (1984) also estimated
that when added together, indirect and direct costs are often greater than 20% of the firm
value. This finding gives reason to believe that financial distress costs are sufficiently
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large enough to support the theory of optimal capital structure that is based on the trade
off between gains from tax shield and losses that accompany the costs of financial
distress.
3.2.1.2 Agency costs
Another restraining influence on the decision to take on high debt is the agency cost of
doing so. Agency cost arises out of what is known as the "principal-agent problem". ill
most large firms the finance providers (principals) are not able to actively manage the
firm. They employ "agents" (managers) and it is possible for these agents to act in ways
that are not always in the best interest of equity or debt holders. Two types of agency
costs discussed are: agency costs of equity and agency costs of debt.
Agency costs of equity has its root in simple argument that one will work harder if one is
the owner of the company than if one is an employee. Also, if one owns a larger
percentage of the company, one will work harder than if one owned a smaller percentage
of the company (Copeland and Weston, 1992). A more detailed discussion of the agency
costs of equity can be found in Appendix L
Agency costs of debt occur because there is a conflict of interest between stockholders
and bondholders. As a firm increases the amount of debt in capital structure, the
bondholder begins taking on an increasing fraction of the firms business and operating
risk, but shareholders and managers still control the firm's business and operating
decisions. This gives managers a variety of different actions of selfish strategies, which
potentially benefit the stockholder at the expense of bondholders. A more detailed
explanation of this action is contained in Appendix H.
3.3 Information costs and signalling effects.
Capital structure theory has become yet another dimension with the explicit modelling of
private information in financial theory. Two main strands have emerged in the literature
on asymmetric information. ill the first approach, debt is regarded as a means to signal
confidence to the firm's investors. ill the second approach, it is argued that the capital
structure is designed to mitigate distortions in the investment decisions caused by
information asymmetries.
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3.3.1 Signalling with proportion ofdebt
In one set of approaches, the choice of capital structure signals to outside investors the
information of insiders. Ross (1977) assumes that managers (the insiders) know the true
distribution of firm returns, but investors do not. He argues that investors interpret larger
levels of leverage as a signal of higher quality. The intuition behind his argument is that
debt and equity differ in an important way that is crucial for signalling insider
information. Debt is a contractual obligation to repay interests and the principal. Failure to
make these payments can lead to bankruptcy and managers may lose their jobs. In
contrast, equity is more forgiving. Although shareholders expect dividends at least to be
maintained, managers have more discretion and can reduce these dividends in times of
financial distress. Therefore, adding debt to the capital structure can be interpreted as a
credible signal of high future cash flows and of the managers' confidence about the firm.
Lower quality firms will not imitate higher quality firm by issuing more debt because they
have higher bankruptcy costs at any level of debt. Accordingly, Ross (1977) concludes
that investors take larger levels of debt as a signal of higher quality and that profitability
and leverage are thus positively related.
The Signaling Hypothesis offers a good prediction of market response to the different
types of security issues. Debt issues signal good news and are greeted with a positive
stock price increase, while equity issues signal bad news, which is meet with significant
stock price decline. However, observed capital structure patterns suggest that the
signalling does not predict actual behaviour very accurately. For example, leverage ratios
have been found to be inversely related to profitability in most industries and not directly
related to it as the Signalling Hypothesis predicts them to be. Another trend is that the
Signalling Hypothesis suggests that the industries with extensive growth options and
intangible assets should employ more debt than mature industries with more tangible
assets. This is because growth companies have more severe information asymmetry
problems and have a greater need for signalling. However, the total opposite has been
found in empirical studies. It can therefore be concluded that the signaling hypothesis
does not explain the real world of modem corporate finance very well (Meggison, 1997).
21
3.3.2 Pecking Order Theory
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that the capital structure can help to mitigate
inefficiencies in a firm's investment program that are caused by information asymmetries.
They show that managers use private information to issue risky securities when they are
overpriced. Because market participants cannot separate information about new projects
from information about whether the firm is under or overvalued, equity will be mispriced
by market participants. If firms are required to finance new projects by issuing equity,
underpricing may be so severe that new investors capture more than the net present value
of the new project, which would result in a net loss to existing shareholders.
Even a positive net present value project will be rejected, leading to yet another under-
investment problem. The information costs associated with debt and equity issues has led
Myers (1984) to argue that a firm's capital structure reflects the accumulation of past
financial requirements. He assumes a firm's manager knows more about the company's
current earnings and investment opportunities than do outside investors, which is an
asymmetric information assumption. Secondly, he assumes that managers act in the best
interest of the firm's existing shareholders. If managers are employed to maximize the
interest of existing shareholders, they will finance the new project with the less
information sensitive instrument. In equilibrium, firms avoids mispricing by walking
down the pecking order: investment is financed first with internal funds, then with new
issue of debt, and finally with new issue of equity.
Thus if good firms choose to finance the new project at all, in Myers and Majluf
equilibrium they will do so with internal financing when available, and if external
financing is required, debt would be preferred over equity.
In contrast to the Trade-Off Theory, there is no well-defined target leverage ratio in the
Pecking Order Theory. There are two kinds of equity- internal and external. One is at the
top of the pecking order and one at the bottom. A firm's leverage ratio thus reflects its
past cumulative requirement for external finance (Baker and Wurgler, 2000).
The Pecking Order Theory can explain why the most profitable firms tend to borrow less:
they simply do not need external funds. Less profitable firms issue debt because they do
not have sufficient internal funds and because debt has lower flotation and information
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costs compared to equity. Debt is the first source of external finance on the pecking order.
Equity is issued only as a last resort, when the debt capacity is fully exhausted. The tax
benefits of debt are a second-order effect. The debt ratio changes when there is an
imbalance between internal funds and real investment opportunities.
3.4 Observed patterns
This section presents observed patterns found through cross-sectional and time senes
studies. The cross- section studies attempt to explain observed financial leverage as a
function of the firm's tax rate, the type assets, profitability, and it is important to
recognize these patterns since there could be a reason why a similar companies have
positioned themselves with a similar capital structures. One possible explanation could be
that companies strive for an optimal capital structure. The time series studies show
whether capital structure has an impact on the firm value through announcement effect on
stock price. The time series studies will reveal whether the capital structure decision has
really affected the firm value.
3.4.1 Cross-sectional studies
From cross sectional studies, certain variables that significantly affect firms leverage were
found. The seven most important variables are country, industry, taxes, assets,
profitability, size and growth.
3.4.1.1 Countries
Well accepted fact is that leverage varies significantly across different countries. The
main contributing factor is the nation's reliance on the capital market versus banks for
corporate financing. Some countries, for example, Japan companies, work in a close
relationship with the nation's banks, and therefore high leverage can often be found. In
the other countries like V.S the capital market is relied on to a much greater extent for
financing and in these countries, a lower leverage is commonly found. Other factors that
influence capital structure decisions are historical, institution and cultural factors, which
are different in different countries. Such studies have shown that American, British,
Australian, and Canadian companies have lower average book value leverage ratios than
their counterparts in Japan, France and Italy and other European countries. On the other
hand, British and German firms have by far the lowest market value leverage ratios
(Rajan & Zingales, 1994).
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3.4.1.2 Industry
Different industry groups have been found to have significant differences in capital
structure. In all developed countries, it has been found that certain industries, such as:
(utilities, transportation companies and mature, capital intensive manufacturing firms,
mining companies and capital-intensive firms with few growth opportunities) are highly
levered while most rapidly growing or technology-based manufacturing companies
employ little or no long-term debt financing. Harris and Raviv, (1991) conclude that firms
within an industry have more in common with each other than firms in different industries
and that there has been a persistent difference in industry debt ratios over time.
3.4.1.3 Assets
The type of assets that the firm holds plays a significant role in determining the firm's
capital structure. A reason for this could be that when a larger proportion of a firm's
assets are tangible, those assets can serve as collateral which diminishes the risk of the
lender from suffering agency cost of debt. The liquidation value of the firm's assets will
also be higher with tangible assets, which will decrease the possibility of mispricing in the
event of bankruptcy and make will lender more willing to supply the loans (Rajan and
Zingales, 1994). It has been also found that firms can borrow at a lower interest rate if
their debt is secured by tangible assets with a long-term value (Williamson, 1998).
Collateralizing the debt also restricts the firms to using the funds for the specified project
and decreases the conflict between the equity holder and debt holders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). In Rajan and Zingles (1994) study of European countries, it was found
that the tangibility of assets is positively correlated with leverage in all countries
examined.
3.4.1.4 Taxes
Studies have proved that increases in corporate income tax rates are associated with
increased debt usage by corporations. However, it a contradictory fact that the capital
structure of American companies has been remarkably constant over the period 1929-
1980, especially compared to the dramatic change in tax rates that has occurred this
century (Bemake &Campbell, 1986). According to the trade off model, taxes should
greatly affect the leverage level.
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3.4.1.5 Profitability
Regardless of the industry in question, it has been found that the most profitable firm
borrows the least. The finding that the more profitable the firm is, the less they borrow, is
contradictory to the Trade-Off Model. The Trade-Off Model suggests that profitable firms
should borrow more, since they have a greater need to protect their income from corporate
taxes. Another factor that support a positive relationship between profitability and
leverage is that the probability of bankruptcy decreases as profitability increases (Myers,
1993). In Rajan and Zingles, (1994) study of European countries it was also found that
profitability is negatively correlated with leverage for all countries, except Germany.
These finding are against Trade-Off Model, but supports the Pecking Order Hypothesis by
Myers and Majluf ,(1984).
3.4.1.6 Size
Size is an important determinant of capital structure. Different studies in the area made by
Friend & Lang (1988), Marsh (1982), Clason & Wilhelmsen (1988), have all reached the
same conclusion that firm's size has a significant positive effect on capital structure. A
possible explanation is that larger fimls are more diversified and bear lower bankruptcy
costs.
3.4.1.7 Growth
Various studies have been conducted and have found that a firm's growth has an impact
on leverage. Marsh (1982) Titman and Wessels, (1988), Friend and Lang (1988), have
shown that firm's growth and leverage has a positive relationship with its capital
structure. This counters the argument that growing firms have more flexibility in their
investment choices and may accept risky projects. Consequently, growth is expected to
have a negative correlation with the leverage ratio (Jensen and Suhler, 1976). Another
argument is that highly levered companies are more likely to procrastinate profitable
investment opportunities (Myers, 1977). These arguments state that firms expecting high
future growth should use a large amount of equity financing, which implies a negative
relationship. The studies show a positive relationship between leverage and growth, which
supports the Pecking Order Hypothesis rather than any other theories.
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3.4.2 Time series studies
Generally speaking, leverage-increasing exchange offers have significant positive
announcement effects on the stock price. This has been found by comparing the two-day
announcement effect for a wide variety of corporate events. Leverage decreasing events,
such exchange of debt with a common stock, have been shown to have a significant
negative effect on the stock price. Evidence by Musulis and Korwar, (1986), Asquith and
Mullins (1986), and Mikleson and Parch, (1986) indicate that issues of seasoned equity
are interpreted as bad news by the marketplace, with significant announcement date
effects on equity prices. This result is consistent with Myers and Majluf's Pecking Order
Hypothesis of capital structure. Firms will only use equity as a last resort where stock
repurchases is at the opposite end of the spectrum. Markets interpret an increase in
leverage as favorable signal about future prospects for the company (Copeland and
Weston, 1992). We can conclude that all the leverage -increasing events have positive
announcement effects while all leverage-decreasing events have negative announcement
effects. Consequently, capital structure affects the value of the firm.
3.5 Concluding comments
The Pecking Order Hypothesis, the Signalling Hypothesis and Trade Off Model explain
observed capital structure patterns. These models do not help us to predict a precise
optimal capital structure. Even though the trade-off model cannot be used to specify a





Firms with more business risk ought to use less debt than lower risk firms, the
greater the business risk, the greater the probability of financial distress at any
level of debt, hence the greater the expected cost of distress. Thus, the firms with
less business risk can borrow more before the expected costs of distress offset the
tax advantage of borrowing.
Firms that have tangible, readily marketable assets such as real estate can use
more debt than firm whose value is primarily derived from intangible assets such
as patent and goodwill. The cost of financial distress depends not only on the
probability of incurring distress but also on what happens if distress occurs.
Specialised assets and intangible assets are more likely to lose value than
standardized, tangible assets if the financial distress occurs
Firms that are currently paying taxes at the highest rate, and that are likely to do so
in the future, should use more debt than firms with lower tax rates.
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• Trade Off Models have intuitive appeal because they lead to the conclusion that
both no debt and all debt are bad, while a "moderate " debt level is good.
However, there has been only mixed empirical support for this model, which
\
suggests that factors not incorporated in the model are also at work.
The signalling theory or asymmetric information, which recognizes that managers have
better information than most investors, postulates that there is a preferred "pecking order"
of financing. This one leads to the conclusion that a firm should maintain borrowing
capacity so that it can always issue debt on reasonable terms rather than have to issue new
equity at the wrong time. Although, no capital structure models provide a method for
accurately calculating optimum capital structure, they all indicate behaviour that, when
incorporated with other factors, can approximately lead to what would be the optimum
capital structure.
3.6 Factors determining capital structure
So far various theoretical models an on which to base optimal capital structure have been
introduced. The cross-section of studies have shown capital structure patterns but have not
explained how the patterns have occurred or whether they are optimal from a firm's point
of view. By combining the knowledge from these sources, it is possible to determine
which factors are most important when determining an appropriate capital structure for a
company in the real estate industry.
3.6.1 Making use oftax shield
A major reason for using debt is that the interest, which is tax deductible, lowers the
effective cost of debt. The more money the firm borrows, the greater the benefit of the tax
shield. Furthermore, the higher a firm's corporate rate is, the greater the advantage of debt
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). However, if much of the firm's income is already
protected from taxes by accelerated depreciation or tax loss carry forwards, its tax rate
will be low, and in this case debt will not be as advantageous as it would be to a firm with
an effective tax rate. Also if a firm is not making a profit, there is no tax advantage to a
debt at all.
The cross-section studies found that profitability is negatively correlated to leverage,
which is contradictory to the Trade-Off Theory of capital structure. A profitable firm
should have every intention of protecting its income from corporate taxes, but the
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opposite is seen in real life. Very profitable firms use the tax shield to a smaller extent,
because these firms do not need much debt financing. The higher rate of return enables
them to do most of their financing with retained earnings (Donaldson, 1961). From a
Trade-Off Model point of view this observed pattern is not optimal.
3.6.2 Limitation to borrowing
Lending and rating agency play an important role when determining how much debt a
firm can issue and to what extent the tax shield can be used. Banks might not want to
issue loans to firms that are already exposed to a high leverage level. Creditors when
issuing additional loans could also use an unsatisfactory debt coverage ratio as a limit. In
the real estate industry, a debt coverage ratio of 1.25 is considered to be a minimum
requirement by creditors (Maisel, 1987). Further, the institute may downgrade a firm's
bond when more debt is issued, and this effect can influence firms to finance their
expansion with equity (Weston and Brigham, 1990).
3.6.3 Business risk
Business risk is defined as the uncertainty inherent in projections of future returns on
assets (ROA) if no debt is issued. The greater the fluctuation in returns on asset, the larger
the firm's business risks. The larger the firm's business risk, the lower is its optimal
leverage level. Business risk is therefore one of the most important factors when making
capital structure decisions. Business risk could either be determined by fundamental
factors as stated below or by unlevered beta. Unlevered beta is derived from equity beta,
which consists of a firm's business and financial risk. Consequently the equity beta must
be unlevered in order to refine business risk. Using equation 3.7, set out below a higher
levered company will have a higher levered beta since a larger financial risk is used
(Copeland and Weston, 1992).
Equation 3.7
I3A= E X I3E D X I3D
D x (l-Tc)+E D x (l-Tc) +E
Equation 3.7 shows how unlevered beta is calculated and is only measure used when
estimating business risk. Fundamental factors will also be used in order to estimate
business risk for the case companies.
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3. 6.3. lIndustry
It can be assumed that compames that belong to the same industry, face the same
economIC conditions, but that economic conditions may vary among industries.
Consequently, industry classification can be used as a proxy for business risk. The cross-
section study in paragraph 3.4.1.2 has shown that different industries experience different
capital structure patterns, which proves that industry classification can be used as a proxy
for business risk (Asgharin, 1997).
3.6.3.2 Growth rate
Capital-intensive firm with few growth opportunities should be highly levered while
technology-based industries with many growth opportunities should have relatively little
debt. This is due to the fact that the growing firms have more flexibility in their
investment choices and may accept risky projects (Myers, 1993).
3.6.3.3 Assets structure
In the cross-sectional studies we found that firms with tangible assets have a higher
leverage ratio compared to firms with intangible assets. This can be explained by their
ability to use tangible assets as collateral for loans. Therefore, it can be assumed that
companies with tangible assets structure experience lower business risk. The real estate
companies are usually highly levered, whereas companies involved in a technological R
& D employ less debt. Tangible assets reduce business risk and therefore also the cost of
financial distress (Asgharin, 1997)
3.6.3.4 Fundamentalfactors causing variance in the future earnings
• Demand variability. Presuming all other factors are constant, the more stable the
unity sales of the firm's products are, lower is its business risk. With stable sales a




Sales price variability. Firms whose products are sold in highly volatile markets
are exposed to higher business risk than similar firms whose output prices are
relatively stable.
Property characteristics. A real estate company's degree of commercial properties
compared to residential ones influences business risk. A higher proportion of
commercial properties often means a higher business risk, ceteris paribus. The
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reason IS that demand fluctuates to a larger extent compared to residential
properties.
3.6.4 Financial risk
Financial risk is defined as the portion of stockholders' risk, over and above business risk,
resulting from the use of financial leverage (Weston and Brigham, 1990). The following
factors will be used in order to estimate financial risk.
3.6.4.1 Leverage level
A company experiencing a larger leverage level is also experiencing large level of fixed
interest payment. Compared to equity financing there is no obligatory fixed payments.
Consequently, a larger leverage level leads to a larger financial risk.
3.6.4.2 Interest coverage ratio
The fixed charges of a firm include principal and interest payment on debt and lease
payments. If the firm wants to take on additional debt, which will increase fixed charges,
it should analyze its expected future cash flows, since fixed charges must be met with
cash. The inability to meet these charges may result in financial insolvency and
bankruptcy. When the debt coverage ratio is equal to one, it means that the firm is just
able to pay its interest expenses. A ratio below one means that the firm will not be able to
pay its interest expenses. The larger the debt coverage ratio is, the lower is the company's
financial risk (Van Home, 1986)
3.6.4.3 Financial beta
A company's total risk is a combination of business and financial risk. In Section 3.5.3
business risk was estimated by using unlevered beta. To refine financial risk from total
risk it is necessary to subtract a company's business risk from the total risk.
Consequently, financial risk is estimated by subtracting unlevered beta (asset beta) from
equity beta (total risk). Evidently, what is left is a measure of company financial risk.
3.6.4.4 Interest rate sensitivity
The interest rate· sensitivity reveals what happens to a firm's results when a one
percentage unit change in the borrowing rate occurs. This sensitivity analysis measures
the exposure of the company's operations to the interest rate risk.
30
3.6.4.5 Financialflexibility
It is crucial for firm not be forced to turn down promising projects because funds are not
available. The firm should always be in a position to raise money, even when the interest
is not favourable. In bad times the suppliers of capital are more willing to make funds
available through bonds to firms with strong balance sheets and secured positions. The
greater the probable future needs for capital, and the worse the consequences of a capital
shortage, the stronger the balance sheet should be. The goal of the firm is to maintain
financial flexibility, which means maintaining adequate reserve borrowing capacity
(Weston and Brigham, 1990) the lower the firm's finance flexibility the higher is the
firm's financial risk.
3.6.5 Business andfinancial risk
A company's total risk consists of a combination of business and financial risk. The total
risk is important since it will determine the total rate of return the investor demands from
the company. In order to reach an appropriate total risk, a company's financial risk must
be determined in relation to the company's business risk. As stated in Sections 3.5.3 and
3.5.4, the industry and the competitive the environment in which the company operates
determine business risk, while financial risk depends upon the capital structure and
financial policies adopted by the company.
As risk levels are determined by the volatility of future expected return, a higher leverage
level will result in a high perception of financial risk since interest has to be paid as a
fixed expense. Conversely, a company, which exclusively uses equity funding, will have a
much lower level of financial risk since dividend payments are not an obligation. It is the
combined level of risk that is important for the company, and this is a measurement that
allows an appropriate business and financial risk to be established.
Based on the criteria given in the figure 3.4, an appropriate combination of business and
financial risk is either the lower right corner where the company faces a low business risk
and a high financial risk or in the upper left corner where it faces a high business risk and
low financial risk. When such a position is achieved, the company's total risk is at a
satisfactory level. An inappropriate position is in the upper right corner where the
company faces a high business risk and a high financial risk. The company's total risk
will be excessively high and its probability of total collapse will increase dramatically.
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Another inappropriate positioning is in the lower left corner where company faces a low
business risk and a low financial risk. Such company would benefit if it accepted a large
financial risk, thus making use of the advantage that come with debt financing, such as
low cost of debt which is significantly lower than the required rate of return on equity. A
higher financial risk is possible for a low business risk company because it has strong
consistent profits and cash flow to cover the fixed payments. However, many such
companies would argue that since they are now highly profitable and cash positive they
do not need to raise debt financing for their business. This is a dangerous "fat and happy"
attitude, which has led to a situation where many companies have been taken over by
corporate raiders.
Figure 3.4 Business and financial risk
Appropriate: Inappropriate:
High business risk High business risk
Low financial risk High financial ris~
Inappropriate: Appropriate:
Low business risk Low business risk







Source: Ernest & Young Corporate Finance: working model
Figure 3.4 shows the appropriate position regarding business and financial risk in terms
of company's total risk.
3.6.6 Management attitude
The last factor to consider when determining capital structure is managerial attitudes.
Some managers are simply more aggressive than others and therefore some firms are
more inclined to use debt in an effort to boost profits whereas other managers are very
conservative and prefer the capital structure that has always been used, even if it is not
optimal (Weston and Brigham, 1990).
32
Empirical studies indicate that the present theoretical models do not provide a precise
optimal capital structure because other factors, which are not incorporated in these
models, are in a play. Therefore, by taking all the above factors into account, a decision
regarding capital structure can be made when evaluating the three case companies.
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY
This chapter will introduce the conditions under which the real estate industry is
operating. Key variables that relate to business and financial risks are analysed within
the industry and across the industries. The companies' total risk profiles are presented,
which determines the appropriateness oftheir capital structure
4.1 Historical background
The history of the real estate industry in South Africa has been tainted with SOCIO-
economic and politics that characterizes the country. Like any other sector, the real estate
industry was affected by the past political regime that had imposed economic, and
political power over one sector of the society. Though this industry has developed
comparably to other emerging economies, it has been affected by the economic sanctions
that South Africa suffered during apartheid era.
The arrival of the political dispensation in 1994 witnessed the removal of the sanctions
and re-integration of the country into rest of the world. The New economic policies have
been adopted in light of different circumstances to foster the economic growth; promote
Foreign Direct Investment; relax monetary policies; promote export and introduce
investment and tax incentives all of which are expected to affect different sectors
favourably including real estate industry.
4.2 Current trend.
Recent studies indicate that the growth in economic activities in different sectors have had
a favorable impact on the real estate industry. The manufacturing or production sector has
grown by 18% since 1996. Physical volumes of production have shown a positive year-
on-year growth rate since 1999 with 2000 being particularly strong. Finance and business
services that. drive the commercial market in general continue to ply an increasingly
strong value-added role in the economy. Share has been increasing steadily in recent years
due to the above average real value added growth of 4.6% recorded from 1996 to 2000.
In terms of sectoral new investment activity, offices have seen an average annual growth
rate of 32% since the year 2000. For the same period, retail property grew by 4% while
industrial property growth experienced negative at-8% (JHI Real Estate Research,
Property Annual Report 2002).
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Property investment transaction activity continues to be boosted via the broad market
concept of securitisation and listing. As an institutional investor class, investment
property exposure in the recent past has generally been reduced due largely to the
relaxation of exchange controls and the move from defined benefit to contribution
pension funds which has promoted greater liquidity and choice of investment.
For the past three years to 2001, listed property beat all asset classes with an annualized
return of 27.9% compared to 23.8% for bonds 11% for equities and 14.4% for money
markets. The performance of broad real estate index (including property
operating/developing companies, rand-hedge stock and listed property sector) indicates
the lower volatility and high recent performance of property compared with the JSE
Securities All Share Index.
On the other hand, there is growmg market concern regarding certain property
fundamentals, particularly growing commercial vacancies and an oversupply of retail
property. This combination resulted in a potential loss of rental income from tenants as
well as pressure on rental rates and escalations. Again, the listed sector's performance in
the recent past is considered by some as unsustainable into the future. This is because of
the limited supporting and favorable technical factors- such as a lower interest rate that
have served to fuel the market of late rather than underlying fundamentals. The negative
impact of interest rate volatility and high inflation are nevertheless posing a threat to the
sector stable performances particularly in supporting business where demand is lacklustre
(JHI Real Estate Research, Property Annual Report 2002).
4.3 Future prospects
While there are mixed signals regarding real estate industry performance in the future,
current trends indicate a further improvement in real estate sector. The number of ongoing
new listings, coupled with the desire by most listed fund managers to increase the size and
the value of their portfolio is reflective of future industry prospects. Moreover, perceived
shortcomings facing the listed property sector relating to size and liquidity are also being
addressed via mergers and acquisitions within the sector. This can result in lower gearing
together with greater market capitalization, in turn promoting an entity with greater
critical mass that will be capable of rising capital for the acquisition of further attractive
investment properties. It can be expected that this will continue on the back of a generally
positive market response thus far.
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Other avenues such as retail tourism, vendor-to-vendor retail and township-to-rural retail
are the opportunities presenting themselves to astute retailers and property developers
both local and in the Southern Africa region. However, trends in information technology
around the world are expected to impact negatively on industrial property. Such
technology may include mechanization, Just In Time and falling production continue to
affect the industrial sector. This has a direct impact on industrial performance and is felt
via rentals and land prices.
The debate around the supply chain management continue to be heard globally -
particularly for warehousing space where the zero inventory theory has been somewhat
countered by less than perfect scenarios brought about by vagaries in business demand
conditions.
In the South African industrial property market, little room for error can be afforded in
meeting customers' needs and as such, some kind of "optimum" stock levels, rather than
zero stock is deemed necessary. In any event, the logistics/supply situation is generally
still quite inefficient, suggesting that companies could run a huge risk by adopting JIT
practices. Furthermore, distribution logistics and E-commerce ventures can arguably still
spur demand for warehousing and distribution space. The future of distribution and
warehousing facilities is therefore still relevant in the South African industrial property
market though the long term future is perhaps more difficult to predict.
One area of potential growth in the "new economy" is for data warehousing or storage.
Data storage demand is predicted to surge in the wake of September 11 an event that
highlighted the importance of security. The demand for data storage facilities
internationally could be mirrored by South Africa data storage sector. Predictions are that
in short-and medium-term, local storage providers could see significant increases in
business as result of new demand. With the drafting of South Africa's
telecommunications policy, this also is a trend that could grow in prominence as
bandwidth and access costs are reduced. One can reasonably conclude that the future for
the real estate industry is bright and this could encourage companies to accept higher
financial risk Eprop Research, 2002.
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4.4 Operational decisions
One widespread concept of real estate companies is that their value growth and result are
governed entirely by the economic cycle, politics, taxes and interest rates. While this view
does hold some truth, the companies' current markets, leverage levels, loan structure,
maturity spreads, and interest subsidies affect their business and financial risk and thereby
their capital structure decisions (Maisel, 1987).
4.5 Industry key variables
The industry key variables in this research would include factors that influence capital






• interest coverage ratio
• interest rate sensitivity
• financial beta, and
These variables do not tell us much individually, but if they are put in a context and
related to each other, they could be valuable sources of information when analysing the
case companies.
4.5.1 Business risk
Two measures have been used in determining the real estate companies' business risk.
These are the unlevered beta and fundamental factors. The most important fundamental
factor is whether a company is focused on residential, commercial or industrial properties.
The reason for categorizing the property portfolio is because commercial and industrial
properties experience higher rental level risk and thereby a higher business risk. However,
residential properties experience low rental level risk resulting in greater stability in
operating income and therefore, a lower business risk.
4.5.1.1 Unlevered beta
Figure 4.1 shows the unlevered beta for different industries. We can see that the real
estate industry experiences the lowest unlevered beta, and one can therefore conclude that
the business risk is low for the real estate industry. The low business risk in the real estate
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industry (property segment) may be due to the nature of business, which mainly
comprises tangible assets.
Figure 4.1: Unlevered beta for different industries (Appendix iv, page 88)
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Figure 4.2 shows the unlevered beta for different companies within the real estate industry
(property). When using unlevered beta as a measure of business risk, Samrand is facing
the highest risk followed by Putprop and Iprop. While Premigro, Panprop, and Confed
face business risk lower than all other real estate companies in the industry.










Ol g. Cl Gl Gl "ii
~
~ -u -u (j) -u
~ % 0 0 ~ ~ ~ S ~ ??~ ; '0 C?J ~ ~ -u -u ; ~IJ, ~ ~ ~ Cl ?: :g ~ ~ ~Cl ~ ~ -u'" 'U>
Cl
Source: Data from JSE Profile's Handbook, 2002
Cadiz Stock Broking Quantitative Research, 200 I
38
4.5.1.2 Property portfolio
These 12 companies are all pure property companies, made up of residential, commercial
and industrial properties (Figure 4.3).












Source: Companies' Annual Reports, 2001
Figure 4.3 shows that Iprop, Premigro, Samrand and Putprop are focused on commercial
properties and hold the lowest proportion of residential properties in the real estate
industry. They are likely to face higher business risk compared to other companies. While
all other companies hold an almost balanced portfolio between commercial and industrial
properties, Gold-edge, Bonatla and Lib-Int hold slightly larger residential portfolios in the
industry and they are likely to face low business risk.
4.5.2 Financial risk
A company's financial risk can be measured in different ways. Four important measures
were selected which include leverage level, the debt coverage ratio, the interest rate
sensitivity and financial beta.
4.5.2.1 Leverage level
The real estate industry is known for being highly levered compared to other industries.
The high leverage level can be explained by the nature of its asset structure. Assets for
this industry are made up of properties, which are very tangible and liquid in nature.
These properties also are good collateral for loans, which makes it easy for real estate
companies to access credit facilities.
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Source: Data from JSE Profile's Handbook, 2002
Cadiz Stock Broking Quantitative Research, 2001
Figure 4.4 indicates that the real estate industry is the fourth highest levered at 60 percent
compared to other industries. The Banking sector is leads with 84 percent followed by
Financial and Information Technology sectors with 78 and 65 percent respectively.
Figure 4.5 shows the leverage level within the real estate industry. It can be seen that the
leverage level oscillates between Putprop's 2 percent and Gold-edge's 88 percent. The
average leverage level in the industry is 60 percent using book values of debt as a proxy
for market value of debt.
Figure 4.5 Leverage level for real estate industry (Appendix vi page 98).











Source: Data from JSE Profile Hand Book, 2002
Cadiz Stock Broking Quantitative Research, 2001
IElleverage
4.5.2.2 Equity/debt ratio
Another ratio illustrating capital structure is the equity ratio. This ratio in inversely related
to the leverage level. Figure 4.6 shows that the real estate industry experiences the third
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financial sectors face equity/debt ratios of 0.19 and 0.29 respectively lower than the real
estate industry.
Figure 4.6 Equity/debt ratios for different industries (Appendix iv, page 88).
equity ratio
I Dequ;ty ratio I
Source:(Data from JSE Profile Hand Book, 2002
Cadiz Stock Broking Quantitative Research, 2001
Figure 4.7 shows the equity ratios within the real estate industry and the trends are similar
to what is evident in the shown figure 4.5 leverage level. Again, Putprop is the company
with largest equity ratios of 41.59 followed by Confed with 12.88, while Premigro
Samrand, Bonatla, and Gold-edge have the lowest equity ratio in the industry. It is worthy
to note that Putprop is virtually an all equity followed by Confed whose capital structure
deviates substantially from the industry norm.











Source: Data from JSE Profile's Handbook, 2002
Cadiz Stock Broking Quantitative Research, 2001
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4.5.2.3 Interest coverage ratio
The interest coverage ratio demonstrates how well the company manages its debt burden
and can be used to predict whether additional debt is appropriate. When the debt coverage
ratio is close to 1, the company is just able to cover its financial expenses with its
operating income. Figure 4.8 indicate that Putprop has the highest interest coverage ratio
in the industry and it can increase its debt without suffering financial distress.
Figure 4.8 Interest coverage ratios for the real estate industry
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A common phenomenon for real estate companies is that they secure their loan portfolio
through interest swaps with different durations, which enable the company to maintain a
low interest coverage ratio. The average interest coverage ratio in the industry is 1.78
times. Putprop has the highest interest coverage ratio of 17.4 followed by Confed and
Panprop with 4.1 and 2.18 respectively. Samrand has interest coverage ratio of 1.6
slightly below industry of 1.78. The interest coverage level is a measure that is also of
interest to creditors. A common measurement for creditors in the real estate industry is to
reject interest coverage ratio below 1.25 (Maise1, 1987).
4.5.2.4 Interest rate sensitivity
All the companies within the industry have conducted a sensitivity analysis, which is able
to reveal what would happen to the company's operating results if the interest rate
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changed by one percent unit. The effect of a one percentage unit change reveals how large
the effect is, in relation to the company's profit base before tax.








Source: (Companies' Annual Reports, 2001)
The industry average is 23% but it varies significantly between the different companies:
from 5% to 58%. Lib-Int and Samrand have secured a large part of their portfolio with
swap agreements and have thereby reduced their sensitivities. Golden-edge, Bonatla and
Premigro on the other hand are heavily levered and consequently are more sensitive to
interest rate changes. I
4.5.2.5 Financial beta
The last measure used when estimating the financial risk is the financial beta. Figure 4.10
indicates that Gold-edge is facing the highest financial beta followed by Samrand whose
financial beta is the second largest in the industry. Confed, Putprop, and Lib-Int face
lowest financial beta in the industry.
1 These estimates on interest rate sensitivity were carried out by the companies to assist in
internal decision-making and were not available for public use. It was therefore not possible to
verify how the result were arrived at, however, these estimates were evaluated based on the
individual circumstances of each company, and the results led the researcher to believe that they
were reasonably correct.
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4.6 Businesses and financial risk
A comparison of two different measures of financial risk is undertaken in order to
determine whether companies' capital structures are appropriate or inappropriate. The
measures of financial risk used are the interest coverage ratio and the leverage level. The
choice of these two measures is made because they are commonly used in the real estate
industry for determining financial risk. However, other measures namely equity ratios and
financial beta could also be used the same way and would lead to the same conclusion
except that in same cases interest rate sensitivity would not yield consistence results.
4.6.1 Business risk and interest coverage ratio
According to Figure 3.4, an appropriate position is either in the upper left corner where
the company faces a low business risk and high financial risk or in the lower right corner
where the company faces a higher business risk and a low financial risk.
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Figure 4.11 Business risk and interest coverage ratio in the real estate industry
(Appendix v, vi, page 88, 98)












Source: JSE Profile's Handbook, 2002 and
Companies' Annual Reports, 2001
According figure 4.11 above, Putprop with the second highest business risk and the
highest interest has interest coverage level in the real estate industry is considered to be
appropriately positioned. However, it could still improve its current capital structure by
taking more debt as it coverage which is excessively high. Gold-edge experiences an
excellent positioning at the lower right corner where low business risk motivates its
higher financial risk. Samrand is however, inappropriately positioned at the upper right
corner, as it has the highest unlevered beta, with the fourth largest leverage ratio and has
interest coverage of 1.6 which is below industry level of 1.78.
4.6.2 Business risk and leverage level
The second measure used to determine financial risk is the leverage level. Figure 4.12
shows business risk and leverage level for the companies in the real estate industry. Gold-
edge is again appropriately positioned in the upper left corner. Both Putprop and Sarnrand
are inappropriately positioned. Even though Putprop has the highest business risk, it could
still improve its capital structure by taking a little more debt. Samrand has the highest
business risk and is levered at an industry average. The company is inappropriately
positioned close to the upper right corner and would improve its financial risk by taking
little less debt or reducing its business risk.
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Figure 4.12 Business risk and leverage level in real estate industry
(Appendix vi, page 98)
Source: JSE Profile's Handbook, 2002
Companies' Annual Reports, 2001

















To get an overview of where the real estate industry is positioned concerning business and
financial risk, different industries are compared. As seen in the Figure 4.13, using
unlevered beta as a measure the real estate industry is exhibits the lowest business risk,
compared to other industries. At the same time the real estate industry is the fourth
highest levered compared to other industries. Only the banking, financials, and
information technology sectors are leading with 84, 78 and 65 percent respectively.
Bearing Figure 3.4 in mind, the real estate industry is close to the appropriate position at
the lower right corner, facing a low business risk and relatively high financial risk.
Figure 4.13 Business risk and leverage level for the real estate industry compared to
other industries (Appendix iv, page88)
Business risk and leverage for different industries














4.6.3 Interest coverage ratio and leverage level
By comparing the companies' leverage levels and debt coverage ratios we can see
whether it would be possible for the companies to increase their leverages. Companies
that have large debt coverage ratio could increase their leverage level without having to
suffer financial distress. For example we can see that Confed and Putprop have the largest
debt coverage ratio in the industry (Figure 4.14). These companies could increase their
debt without experiencing a low debt coverage ratio, which would be unacceptable. If
these two companies increased their leverage level they would increase the value of the
tax shield without being exposed to unacceptable financial distress. However, other
companies would not be able to raise additional debt without suffering financial distress
as they have low interest coverage ratios.
Fiqure 4.14 Interest coverage ratio and leverage level for real estate industry
(Appendix v, vi, page 88, 98).











'0 20 30 40 50
leverage %
60 70 80 90 '00
Source: JSE Profile's Hand Book, 2002
Companies' Annual Reports, 2001
4.6.4. Summary
Even though there are mixed signals about the real estate sectors performances, current
trends indicate a further improvement in the sector. The number of ongoing new listings,
the desire by most listed fund managers to increase the size and the value of the portfolio
is reflective of future industry prospects. The removal of the economic sanctions,
reintegration of the country to the rest of the world, the adoption of new economic
policies to foster economic growth, the promotion of Foreign Direct Investment, the
relaxation of monetary policies, the promotion of export, tax and investment incentives all
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are expected to affect this sector favourably. Likewise, other venues such as retail
tourism, township/rural retail and data storage demand are opportunities being presented
to retailers and property developer in the industry.
The analysis of business risk for different industries indicates that the real estate sector is
experiencing the lowest unlevered beta, which indicates low business risk in the industry.
Business risk for companies in the real estate sector differs depending on the property
portfolio they hold. Commercial properties suffer more business risk than residential and
industrial property respectively.
To determine whether a company has set its capital structure appropriately requires
consideration of both business risk and financial risk. According to figure 3.4, an
appropriate combination of business and financial risk is either at the lower right corner
where the company faces a low business risk and high financial risk or in the upper left
corner where the compallY faces high business risk and low financial risk. The analysis of
case companies indicates that Putprop has an inappropriate combination of business and
financial risk, since the company has higher than average business risk and is facing
exceptionally low financial risk due to the higher interest coverage ratio, the low leverage
level, and low interest rate sensitivity. Even though the company faces business risk
higher than average, the leverage does not have to be the lowest in the industry.
Similarly, Samrand has an inappropriate combination between business and financial risk
because the company has both the highest business and financial risk. It would improve
its capital structure by taking less debt or reducing its business risk. Unlike Putprop and
Samrand, Gold-edge has an appropriate combination of both business risk and financial
risk. The analysis reveals that the company has low business risk due to the fact it has
lowest unlevered beta in the industry. The company's current financial risk is high
because of high leverage level, relatively low interest coverage ratio and high interest rate
sensitivity. However, the low business risk indicates that company can maintain the
current position since future cash flows are stable and predictable. Gold-edge has
positioned itself as a low business risk and high financial risk company, which is an
appropriate positioning according to Figure 3.4.
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: THE CASE OF PUTPROP
This chapter will present and analyse how this company's capital structure is determined
and will recommend any improvement which can be made.
5.1 Introduction
Putprop is one of the listed property companies in JSE and was founded and listed in
1988. The company was established at time when South Africa was at the height of
economic and political sanctions. Due to the constraints on external financing, the
company adopted the strategy of being strong equity based company, in order to persist at
that time and to be able to survive in future in such circumstances. Putprop's business
strategy is to acquire and take part in the construction of properties new with higher
development potential. They will then add value to these properties and when no further
value can be added, these properties are sold off.
Putprop focuses on a local presence in each region in which it operates so as to create a
close contact with market. The real estates portfolio is geographically concentrated in
Gauteng, Western Cape and Kwazulu Natal. The properties in Putprop's portfolio can be
defined as commercial properties comprising both office and retail. Offices are as those
building that are used predominantly for office and administration purposes and retail
property includes the value centres and community shopping centres. Industrial properties
include those properties commonly used as factory, plants and other actual production
activities and residential properties include those building for residential purposes.
5.2 Putprop Property Portfolio
The property portfolio in Figure 5.1 indicates that Putprop faces high business risk
because it focuses on commercial properties. Commercial properties are more closely tied
to GDP and other broad economic indicators and consequently suffer high vacancy rate
during high inflation period.
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Figure 5.1 Putprop's property portfolio
PROPERTY PORTFOLIO
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5.3 Putprop's Capital Structure
5.3.1 Leverage Ratios
Putprop is the lowest levered company in the real estate industry, with 2 percent leverage
level compared to that of industry of60 percent (Figure 5.2).
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Source: Putprop annual report, 2001
50
5.3.2 Putprop's equity ratios
Putprop's equity to debt ratio increased from 17.2 to 41.59 during the last three years and
the company has the highest equity ratio in industry Figure 5.3 shows.












Source: Putprop annual Reports, 2001
5.4 Capital structure in the future
The Putprop's goal and target regarding capital structure is to be all equity-financed
company and to use non-interest bearing finance as much as possible. Putprop's current
equity ratio is 98%, which reveals that the company has reached its target ratio. The
company intends to maintain this target in the future. The company management has
decided to state their goal in terms of book value instead of market value. The long-term
goal of reaching 95% of equity ratio was set five years ago and at that time the book value
was identical to the market value of the properties. However, these values are not
identical today. The company's CFO urges that using book value is accurate, and if
adjusted equity ratio were used instead, Putprop would experience an even more attractive
ratio than today. Consequently, the company executives perceive a higher equity ratio as
more attractive than otherwise.
5.5 WACC and shareholder value
The CFO does not believe that the current capital structure optimizes the value of the
company, nor the target ratio of 95%. An optimal structure for the shareholders would
mean a higher debt financing thim today. However, he defends current capital structure by
saying that it is preferable for the company to keep the higher level of equity financing.
The higher equity level allows the company to stay financially flexible and be able to be
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in the position of acquiring new properties. The CFO does not believe that a higher
leverage company is a proof of a strong company even though the market prefers a low
WACe. He further believes that a heavily debt financed company, sooner or later, will
experience a debt burden too large for the company to survive.
5.6 How Putprop determines capital structure.
As it can be seen, the company has positioned itself as the least levered company in the
real estate (property) industry and it's current equity ratio of 98 percent has exceeded its
goal of 95 percent. Now the question is, how does the company decide upon its capital
structure? Is there any model used in the process? What factors are important when
making capital structure decisions?
By interviewing the company Chief Financial Officer (CFO) it was found Putprop does
not use any of the model outlined Chapter 3 when they decide upon their capital structure.
The argument for not using any model is that they are not familiar with them. Neither
have they estimated the cost of bankruptcy, which is necessary for using the Trade Off
Model. !he closest the company has come to calculating the cost of bankruptcy is to
estimate the worth of their assets if they were sold off. However, instead of using any
models, there are several factors the company considers when they make their capital
structure decisions. These factors are the strength of the assets, history and debt coverage
ratio.
5.6.1 Strength offinancial assets
The company mortgage level of their properties is important when deciding on capital
structure. Putprop prefers being a strong property company in the real estate industry with
a strong balance sheet. Keeping strong assets allows the company to stay financially
flexible and minimizes the fmancial risk.
5.6.2 History
History also plays an important role when Putprop decides its capital structure. When the
company was listed on the JSE in 1988, it laid out principle guidelines regarding their
long-term strategies and goals. These strategies and goals were decided amid the height of
the economic and political sanctions that faced the country. By keeping a strong equity
base, the company wanted to be prepared to sustain and survive in such an environment if
it persisted.
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5.6.3 Interest coverage ratio
The interest coverage ratio is another factor that the company takes into account in
deciding its capital structure. The ratio indicates how sensitive it is to financial risk and
whether a possibility exists to increase its leverage level.
All the above factors are taken into account when the company decides its capital
structure. However, the CFO argues that the most important factor is the history. Further
findings regarding the company capital structure are that it would consider changing its
capital structure if the tax rate is changed. The company does not think in terms of
business risk when it decides upon its capital structure, though it perceives the business
risk as higher compared to other companies in the industry.
5.7 Analysis of Putprop's capital structure
There are several factors that need to be taken into account when determining an optimal
capital structure. These factors include:
• make maximum use of the tax shied, which means using debt financing as long as
the debt burden does not constrain the company;
• practical limitation to debt financing must be investigated, For instance, does the
company have an acceptable debt coverage ratio?;
• business risk should be established. Knowing the level of business risk will assist in
estimating an appropriate financial risk;
• ability to cope with cunent financial and future financial risk; and
• determining the effect the leverage would have on WACC and shareholder value.
5.7.1 Making use ofthe tax shield
The company showed a substantial operating profit for years 1998 to 2000 compared to
2001, which supports the argument for making use of tax shield to the maximum. A large
debt financing will also reduce the company's WACC, which in turn will increase the
value of the company, according to Copeland and Weston (1992). According to the
Trade- Off Theory, debt financing should be used as long as the gain from the tax shield
exceeds the cost of financial distress. There are many pieces of evidence indicating that
the company has not yet reached the trade-off level, as seen in the Figure 4.5. Putprop is
the least levered company in the industry and this gives one reason to believe it has not
reached its trade-off level. The interest coverage ratio further supports this view since it is
unnecessarily high (Figure 4.8). To find an appropriate leverage level, the analysis of the
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company business risk and financial risk is undertaken. However, it IS important to
establish if there is any practical limitation to acquire additional debt.
5.7.2 Limitation on borrowing
At the current leverage level, the company experiences no problem concerning additional
borrowing. The reason for this is that they are lightly mortgaged and the properties owned
are excellent collateral. The company has a leverage level of 2% and could increase its
borrowing at least to the level of industry average of 60% without experiencing a higher
interest rate. Even if they could only borrow above industry average, the interest rate
would only raise few basis points. It is reasonable therefore to conclude that there is no
practical limitation for the company to take on additional debt with its current capital
structure. Since there is no practical limitation on debt financing, the appropriate leverage
level depends on the company's business risk.
5. 7.3 Business risk
Three measures have been used to establish the company's business risk: the industry
average; the unlevered beta and other factors that could cause variations in future
earnings. None of these factors provide a perfect measure of business risk alone.
However, when the results from each of these measures are combined, a good estimation
ofbusiness risk can be established.
5.7.3.1 Industry leverage
Figure 4.4 shows the leverage level for different industries. The real estate industry is the
fourth largest levered at 60 percent average. Though the industry is fourth highest levered
compared to other industries, it is not as highly levered as one would expect since real
estate presents the excellent collateral assets against which banks and other financial
institutions will lend money. However, if the present industry leverage level can be
considered as the industry norm, then one can safely assume that market perceives this
industry as a risky one.
On other hand, others reasons that might explain this observation, are for instance:





a limited supply of quality stock underpinned by quality
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• under capitalization (less than 1% of 13billion of the total JSE market) of listed
property sector; and
• a growing market concern over commercial vacancies and loss of rental income
from the tenants and increased pressure on rental rates (JHI Property Report,
2002)
5.7.3.2 Unlevered beta.
Figure 4.2 shows that Putprop is facing an unlevered beta of 0.71, which is the second
largest in the industry. The higher unlevered beta indicates that Putprop is facing a larger
business risk compared to other companies in the real estate.
5.7.3.3 Fundamentalfactors that cause variation infuture earnings
• Focus on commercial properties. The company portfolio consists of commercial,
industrial and residential properties. The higher concentration in commercial
properties (Figure 5.1) increases the company business risk due to the volatility in
commercial property market. Unlike commercial rents, which are more closely
tied to GDP and other broad economic indicators, residential rents are driven by
household disposable income and inflation as well as normal market dynamics.
Residential property is considered to give excellent return on investment and
carries a lower risk than commercial property. On the other hand, broad economic
indicators similar to those that affect commercial properties also affect industrial
property. However, industrial property suffers fewer vacancies compared to
commercial properties. It can be observed that Putprop holds less residential and
industrial properties, which indicates the reason why it has second largest business
risk in the industry.
• Rent out level. The company sells off properties where a maximum rent out level
has been reached and then acquires properties where the rent out level has not yet
reached a maximum. This strategy increases the business risk because of price
dynamics in the property market.
• Rental prices can be seen as fairly stable and are more likely to increase than
decrease due to favorable economic forecasts in the future. Presently commercial
rental prices are under pressure because of market oversupply, especially in the
retail property market and recent inflation causing high levels of commercial
vacanCIes.
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5. 7.4 Financial risk
Four indices for estimating financial risk have been established. The leverage level, the
interest coverage ratio, financial beta and interest rate sensitivity.
5.7. 4.ILeverage level
Figure 4.5 shows that Putprop is the least levered company in the industry. The company
leverage level of 2% should be compared to the industry average of 60% and the company
equity ratio of 41.59 should be compared to the industry average of 0.69 (Appendix vi,
page99)
5.7.4.2 Interest coverage ratio.
The company interest coverage ratio of 17.4 is the highest in the industry, as observed in
the Figure 4.8. The company does not show any sign of financial distress and the higher
level of leverage can be accepted. A debt coverage ratio of 1.25 is traditionally set as a
minimum ratio that creditors will accept (Maisel, 1987). Based on this argument, Putprop
could increase its current interest expense to the extent of maintaining the industry norm
of interest coverage ratio of 1.25. If the company were to maintain interest coverage ratio
at 1.25 it would be able to increase its current leverage level. The increase in leverage
level would decrease company WACC, which in turn will increase value of the company
(Copeland and Weston, 1992)
5.7.4.3 Financial beta
The company's financial beta is .01 (Appendix vi, page99), which is approximated to beta
of zero when compared to the industry financial beta of0.17.
5.7.4.4 Interest rate sensitivity
A sensitivity analysis is used to see how exposed Putprop is to interest rate changes. The
analysis reveals that a one-percentage unit change in borrowing would change the profit
before tax by 3 percent. The company is not easily affected by interest rate changes
because of its low leverage level. For the industry on average, a one percentage unit
change in interest will cause a fall in profit before tax by 20 percent. This further indicates
the extent to which the company is protected from interest volatility as it compares far
more favorably than other companies.
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5.7.5 Coping with financial risk
The company is not worried about its ability to raise new capital if new investment
opportunities occur, since its properties are less mortgaged. The company stays
financially flexible by taking virtually no financial risks. The company is characterized by
maintaining sustainable earnings and a large portion of these earnings have been retained
in the business as part of the strategy to build a strong equity base. This strategy is
expected to continue, which will further increase the future equity base. Consequently, the
company is considered to be strong, with virtually no limitation to capitalizing on any
new opportunities.
5.8 Conclusions
5.8.1 How Putprop determines capital structure
The conclusion regarding how the Putprop determines its capital structure is that it does
not use any models explained in Chapter 3. The reason is that they are not familiar with
these models. Instead of using these models, the company takes several fundamental
factors into account. The company analyses each' fundamental factor individually and
from these separate analyses, an overall picture regarding a capital structure decision is
made. The most important fundamental factor when the company's capital structure
decision is made is to sustain a strong equity base. The reason is that the company was
established at the height of economic and political sanctions under which South Africa
was placed and consequently the company long-term goal of high equity ratio was
determined in order to survive in such an environment.
5.8.2 Improvement in Putprop's capital structure.
From the above analysis one can reasonably conclude that the company's leverage level is
too low. This conclusion is based on the fact that it has an inappropriate combination
between business and financial risk. The business risk analysis reveals that the company
has a higher than average business risk, this is due to the fact that company has the second
highest unlevered beta in the industry. Further, the company's fundamental factors also
indicate a higher business risk. Again, the company is facing an exceptionally low
financial risk due to the higher interest coverage ratio, the low leverage level and low
interest rate sensitivity. Putprop's position as can be seen in Figure 4.12, is inappropriate,
according to figure 3.4. Even though the business risk is higher than the average, there is
no reason why the leverage has to be the lowest in the industry.
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Another argument supporting an increase in leverage level is based on the Trade-Off
Model. The company made a profit of R29, 914 million in 2001, which is a strong
argument for using the tax shield to the maximum. Putprop is a financially strong
company based on its high interest coverage ratio, and low interest sensitivity, but they
have chosen not to take on a higher leverage. It is proposed that it would be theoretically
possible for the company to increase its leverage, without suffering financial distress.
The company has not tried to calculate its trade-off level, where debt should be accepted
as long as the gain from the tax shield exceeds the cost of financial distress, which
according to the Trade-Off Model is the point of optimum capital structure. It should be
noted that the company is aware that a higher leverage would increase the theoretical
value of the company, even though they prefer not to use debt financing since the
strategic goal regarding capital structure states a preference to be an equity financed
company.
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6 CHAPTER SIX: THE CASE OF GOLD-EDGE
This chapter will present Gold-edge and its capital structure, analyze how company
capital structure decisions are made and determine whether any improvement is possible.
6.1 Introduction
Gold-edge is one of the real estate companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
(JSE) in South Africa. The business of the company consists of acquiring, building,
managing and selling properties. The company was founded inl997 and listed on the JSE
1998. Currently the company is active in the major three areas in South Africa, which are
Gauteng, Cape Town and Durban. The company geographical location decisions are made
with intention of capitalizing on the growth potential ofproperties with high liquidity.
The company's property is divided into industrial, commercial and residential properties
as Figure 6.1 shows. The portfolio is dominated by industrial properties, which represent
about 40% followed by residential and commercial properties with 31 % and 29%
respectively. Though the company portfolio is currently concentrated in industrial
properties, the future company strategy is to make long-tenn investments in residential
properties since it is a safe and reliable segment. They believe in keeping good customer
relations which give them an incentive to be customer- oriented and have an effective
property management strategy.








The Figure 6.1 above indicates that Gold-edge hold a large proportion of its portfolio in
industrial and residential properties. These portfolios suffer less market volatility and
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consequently the company has less business risk compared to other companies in the real
estate industry.
6.2 Gold-edge capital structure
6.2.1 Leverage level
The company has the highest leverage level in the real estate industry, with 88% in 2001,
(refer to Figure 6.2). The company's leverage level can be compared with real estate
industry average of 60 percent.
Figure 6.2 Gold-edge leverage ratio
Leverage ratio
11.7% 0.26%




Source: Gold-edge Annual Reports, 2001
6.2.2 Equity ratio
The company's current equity ratio is 11.7 percent (Figure 6.2) and is the lowest in the
real estate industry.
6.3 Capital structure in the future
The company's quantitative guideline and goals concerning capital structure are to have
an equity ratio not more or less than 15%, though they intend to increase this ratio in the
future to a minimum of 20%. However, this equity ratio would be adjusted depending on
the prevailing circumstances, preferably to maintain it in accordance with book value of
properties.
6.4 Strategies for capital structure.
The company's strategy to achieve its capital structure goal is to mortgage each property
as much as possible, and use the maximum leverage possible. Gold-edge's properties are
currently mortgaged up to 89% using the book value and 72% using the market value of
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the properties. The mortgage nOllli in the industry is 75% using book values. In other
words, the company's current capital structure is above industry norm.
6.5 How Gold-edge determine capital structure
This section intends to look at how the company decided upon its current capital structure
and if any models have been used. Further, it will look to the important factors Gold-edge
considered when making the capital structure decisions.
When interviewing the CFO it was evident that no specific models are used when capital
structure decisions are made. The argument for not using any of the models is that they
are not familiar with them. Also the company has never estimated the cost of bankruptcy,
which is necessary for using the Trade-Off Model. The argument for not estimating the
bankruptcy cost is that they simply do not think in terms of going bankrupt. However,
instead of using any models, there are several factors that the company considers when





• rental income and interest expense,
• strength of balance sheet asset
6.5.1 Business risk
According to the company's CFO the company business risk is considered to be most
important factor when the capital structure decision is made. He argues that a low
business risk motivates a high leverage and believes his company has lower business risk
compared to its competitors because the company enjoys high rental level and has its
properties in the attractive areas. However, he admits that rental from commercial
properties has been volatile due to high vacancies coupled with competitive rental
pressure from clients as the result of an oversupply of commercial properties in the recent
past.
6.5.1 Financial risk
The company's current financial risk is also important when determining capital structure.
The CFO perceives the company's financial risk to be extremely high, but he does not see
61
that as a threat. He further states that the higher financial risk is justifiable because of a
low business risk
6.5.2 Interest rate
To find an appropriate leverage level, the company uses simulation to examine the effect
that changes in the interest rate will have. The simulation takes into account the interest
rate and the borrowing levels, and how those variables would affect the company
financial situation. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted, which provides the company
with information about interest rate movements.
6.5.3 Management attitude
Traditional is the managerial attitude that further influences capital structure decisions.
The company has traditionally been a highly levered company, which is used as norm
when they decide their leverage level.
6.5.4 Rental income and interest expenses
Rental income and interest expense are compared when deciding upon the appropriate
leverage level and to be certain that the fixed costs are not too large.
6.5.5 Strength ofthe balance
The company evaluates how strong the asset side of the balance sheet is. The stronger the
asset side the higher the leverage that can be accepted. The CFO believes the company
has a strong balance sheet mainly because of its unmortgaged properties in high attractive
nodes in Gauteng and Cape Town.
6.5.6 Borrowing
A last point regarding their capital structure decision is not a factor but a strategy. The
company simply borrows as much as possible when they enter into a new investment and
this keeps the company capital structure dominated by a higher debt level.
All of the above factors are taken into account when the company decides on an
appropriate capital structure, since at the moment they perceive their business as low risk
higher financial risk can be motivated.
According to the Gold-edge CFO, the SIze of the tax rate does not influence the
company's decision regarding capital structure. The size of the profit is also irrelevant
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when they determine their capital structure. Profit will only affect capital structure in the
sense that the profit will increase equity, which will change the balance sheet debt and
equity (assuming the dividends are kept constant)
6.6 Analysis of Gold-edge's capital structure
There are several factors that needed to be taken into account when determining an
optimal level of capital structure. These factors include:
• maximum use of the tax shield, which means using debt financing as long as the
debt burden does not constrain the company.
• practical limitation to debt financing must be investigated. For instance, does the
company have acceptable debt coverage ratio?
• establishment of the company's business risk, knowing the level of business risk
will assist in estimating an appropriate financial risk;
.ability to cope with current financial and future financial risk should be assessed;
and
• determining the effect the leverage would have on the company's WACC and
shareholder value.
6.6.1 Making use of tax shield
According to the Trade-Off Model, a company should try to make maximum use of the
tax shield that comes with debt financing. A crucial assumption for benefiting from the
tax shield is that the company is making a profit. Gold-edge has been making a profit for
the past three years, therefore this provides a compelling reason for the use of the tax
shield to the maximum. Presently the company is the highest levered in the industry and
this could possibly imply the use of the tax shield as the model suggests.
The Trade-Off Model advocates that the debt financing should be used as long as the gain
from taking the extra debt exceeds the cost of financial distress that the extra debt brings.
To investigate whether their current leverage level is optimal the analysis of business and
financial risk is undertaken, but first, it needs to be established if there is any practical
limitation to acquiring additional debt.
6.6.2 Limitation to borrowing
There are almost no practical limitations for the company to borrow money. The market
conditions facing the company are good and according to the company Chief Financial
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Officer, the company still has borrowing capacity, partly due to the fact that they have
established a long-term close relationship with their bank and they have not used up their
entire credit limit. Creditors are willing to extend borrowing facilities to the companies in
the real estate industry provided that the company concerned has interest coverage ratio of
at least 1.25 (Maisel, 1987). Presently the company has the minimum interest coverage
ratio of 1.25 and has mortgaged 87 percent of its assets more than industry norm of 75
percent. Therefore, one can reasonably assume that it has reached the maximum
borrowing capacity beyond which any additional financing will be accepted at extra
borrowing cost which will be higher than the current borrowing interest rate. Even though
the company has established a good relationship with its bank, from practical viewpoint
one can conclude that it has reached its maximum borrowing capacity.
6.6.3 Business risk
Three measures have been used to establish the company's business risk: the industry
leverage, the unlevered beta and other factors that could cause variation in future
earnmgs. None of these though, provide a perfect measure of business risk alone.
However, by combining the results from each of these measures, a good estimation of
business risk can be established.
6.6.3.1 Industry leverage
Figure 4.4 shows that the real estate is levered at 60%, and is the fourth highest levered
industry compared to other industries. According to theory, a higher leverage level in the
industry is a sign that the industry is facing a low business risk (Grundy and Ward, 1996).
This is exactly what is observed in the real estate industry, and one can assume that the
industry faces a low business risk.
6.6.3.2 Unlevered beta
Figure 4.2 shows unlevered beta, which indicates the business risk. One can see that
Gold-edge is facing the lowest business risk compared to other companies in the industry.
However, the overall unlevered beta in the real estate industry is low compared to other
industries. As seen in Figure 4.2, the company faces low unlevered beta compared to their
competitors. One can then conclude that the company's business risk is low.
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6.6.3.3 Fundamental factors causes variances in the future earnings
• Rental income. The company rental income has fluctuated very little in the past.
Accurate prediction of future profit can be made and there is a reason to believe
that the rental income in future will increase or at least stabilize due to favorable
economic and industry fundamentals discussed in Chapter four.
• Rental level risk. Another factor related to business risk is the rental level risk,
which is the risk that current tenants are likely to move out. For residential
properties, the risk does not really exist, since there is great demand for residential
housing in the urban areas of the large cities where the company holds properties.
For industrial property there is little risk for vacancies compared to commercial
properties. According to company's CFO the industrial rental level has oscillated
from 93 percent to 97 percent for the past three years and during periods of high
inflation the company has been able to pass extra costs caused by inflation on to
tenants unlike with commercial properties where such discretion is limited. Gold-
edge holds 69 percent of residential and industrial combined and the rental risk for
this portion of portfolio is low, this provides the reason for one to conclude that
the company income is stable except for small variations due to nature of the
commercial property market.
• Liquid assets. The company's residential and industrial properties are all located in
areas considered to have high market potential, which increases their stability and
results in less liquidity risk. The above analysis leads one to conclude that the
company is experiencing a lower business risk than its competitors.
6.6.4 Financial risk
Four measures to estimate financial risk have been used:
• the leverage leve
• interest coverage ratio
• the financial beta, and
• the interest rate sensitivity
6.6.4.1 leverage level
Figure 4.5 shows that the company is the highest levered in the industry. The company's
leverage and debt-equity is 88 percent and 8.41 times compared to the industry average of
65
60 percent and 1.46 times respectively. The higher leverage level indicates that the
company faces higher financial risk.
6.6.4.2 Interest coverage ratio
The company's debt coverage ration for the past four years can be seen in table 6.1.







Source: Gold-edge annual report 2001
For the past four years the company has experienced an interest coverage ratio above 1.25
the ratio that is acceptable as industry norm. Though the company has been able to remain
within an acceptable range on average, it has the third lowest interest coverage ratio in the
industry (Figure 4.8), which can be compared to industry average of 1.78. The low
interest coverage ration indicates on average that the company is exposed to high financial
risk.
6.6.4.3 Interest rate sensitivity.
The analysis of interest rate sensitivity indicates that the company profit before tax will
fall by 58 percent in response to a one percentage unit changes in interest rate. The
decline in the company profit will be the consequence of its high leverage level. It must
be noted that the extent to which the company will suffer is above industry average
because of high fixed costs the company has to meet irrespective of its performance.
6.6.5 Coping with financial risk
6.6.5.1 Strategies for financial fleXibility
The analysis above indicates that Gold-edge is exposed to substantial financial risk. The
company uses two strategies to avoid the likelihood of being plunged into financial
distress. The first strategy is "golden eggs" and the second one is to maintain the long
term relationship with their bank.
The "golden edge" strategy is to keep the most attractive properties unmortgaged as long
as possible. The company calls these attractive properties their "golden edge" properties.
If they are ever forced to mortgage the golden edge properties, these properties will be the
first to amortize. By keeping the "golden edge" properties unmortgaged, these properties
can be used as a buffer if there is an urgent need of capital. This is due to the fact that
these properties are considered extremely attractive and liquid.
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The second strategy used by Gold-edge to stay financially flexible is to keep a close
relationship with their bank. The company works in a long-term relationship where trust
is the common denominator between the two parties. It means that the company does not
shop around for the cheapest loan like any other competitors do, even if their bank
happens to be few basis points more expensive. In return for being a faithful customer, the
bank is willing to offer the company new loans even in bad times, when other companies
might experience difficulties in raising new debts from banks.
Another danger of being highly levered as this company is that the fixed charge becomes
high. The company must be confident that they can keep sufficient cash flow to cover the
fixed interest costs. From their debt coverage ratio, one can see that that the income from
company operations has managed to cover fixed interest cost on average.
6.7 Conclusions
6.7.1 How Gold-edge determines capital structure
The conclusion regarding how Gold-edge determines its capital structure is that it does
not use any of the models explain in chapter three. The reason is that they are not familiar
with models and that models are too technical to use. However, one notices that the
company follows the Trade-Off Model, though unintentionally. This is due to the fact that
the company makes the maximum use of the tax shield, since they are the highest levered
in the industry. Again, the company has estimated the financial risk of adding more debt
as being too large, just as the Trade Off Model states. A higher Leverage would certainly
mean a higher risk of bankruptcy and an increase of financial distress. From the above
argument one can see that the trade off model is unintentionally in use, which takes into
consideration the benefit of tax shield, and the cost of financial distress. Similarly, the
company takes several fundamental factors into account and every fundamental factor is
analyzed and the general picture regarding their capital structure is then created.
The most important factor for Gold-edge when deciding on an appropriate capital
structure is business risk, which is a starting point when they determine leverage level.
The company argues that the lower the business risk, the higher the leverage level that can
be accepted. The company perceives the business risk as low based on its high rental level
and the fact that the properties are located in areas where the potential for growth and
demand is high. The company perceives its business risk as low, and this allows them to
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take a high leverage. Another important factor is tradition. Gold edge has historically been
a high levered company, which they use as their argument to justify their high leverage
level in the future. This means that they have a tendency to use historical data when
determining current capital structure.
6.7.2 Improvement in Gold-edge's capital structure.
From the analysis one can conclude that Gold-edge's capital structure is optimal or close
to optimal. This conclusion is based on the fact that the company has an appropriate
combination of business and financial risk, and that they make maximum use of tax shield
and deal with high financial risk in an appropriate way. The analysis reveals that the
company has a low business risk due the fact that it has the fourth lowest unlevered beta
in the industry. Other factors that support the company low business risk are the location
of properties in areas with a high potential for growth and demand. The company's
current financial risk is high due to the high leverage level, relatively low interest
coverage ratio, and higher interest rate sensitivity. Gold-edge has positioned itself as a
low business risk and high financial risk company as seen in figure 4.11 and 4.12, which
is an appropriate positioning, according to Figure 3.4.
Gold-edge's interest coverage ratio indicates that the company is just at an industry norm,
but below industry average. However, if any additional debt were accepted the operating
profit might not be able to cover fixed interest expense, thus putting the company in
financial distress. The present interest coverage can be maintained with the current
leverage level provided the company's business environment does not change to affect
company's low business risk and the company continues to maintain its "golden egg"
strategy and close relationship with the bank. .
It is reasonable to argue that the current leverage level is appropriate, since the present
cash flow is large enough to cover fixed interest expenses. The low business risk further
indicates that the company can maintain its current position since future cash flows are
stable and predictable. Therefore the current leverage level can be maintained in the
future without causing financial distress. Lowering the leverage would decrease the
financial risk, but at the same time make less use of the tax shield, hence lowering the
value of the firm.
This leads one to conclude that the company's current capital structure is optimal or close
to optimal and no change should be made.
68
7 CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CASE OF SAMRAND
This chapter will present Samrand and its capital structure, the analysis of how the
company determines its capital structure and ifany improvement can be made.
7.1 Introduction.
Samrand is one of the real estate companies founded in 1971 and was listed on the JSE in
1987. It is one of the few property companies that managed to survive the sanctions era
which country was undergoing when it was listed in 1980s. The principal activity of the
company is property investment, property development and the sale thereof. The company
property portfolio is concentrated in commercial properties where it holds more than 68
percent of its total portfolio. The company strategy is to continue their current
concentration in areas where there is an opportunity for growth and market potential and
to develop close relationships with its present customer and new customer base by
targeting the business society and local authorities, as well as education and research
institutions.





Source: Samrand Annual Reports, 2001
The above figure indicates that Samrand holds a large proportion of its portfolios in
commercial property. The commercial property market is more volatile than residential
and industrial markets and consequently the company has the highest business risk in real
estate industry.
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7.2 Samrand's capital structure
7.2.1 Leverage ratios
In 2001 the company reached 60 percent debt financing, (Figure 7.2). This compares well
to the industry average ratio of 60 percent.




11 interest bearing liabilities
Dequity
Source: Samrand Annual Reports, 2001
7.2.2 Equity ratio
The company's current equity ratio IS 0.67, which is slightly lower than the average
equity ratio in the industry of 0.69.
7.3 Capital structure in the future
Samrand's main future goal concerning its capital structure is to maintain the same
leverage ratio as that of the industry. Currently the real estate industry leverage ratio is 60
percent, the same as that of the company. Management is satisfied with its existing capital
structure, and consequently this capital structure will be maintained in the future.
7.4 How Samrand determines capital structure
This section intends to look into how the company decided upon its current capital
structure and if any models have been used. Further, it looks to the important factors to
consider when making the capital structure decisions.
When interviewing the CFO, it was evident that no specific models are used when capital
structure decisions are made. The argument for not using any of the models is that they
are not familiar with them. Also the company has never estimated the cost of bankruptcy,
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which is necessary for using the Trade-Off Model. However, instead of using any models,
there are several factors that the company considers when making capital structure




• interest rate, and
• management attitude.
7.4.1 Industry leverage
Samrand's most important factor when determining capital structure is leverage level in
the industry. The company argues that there is a reason why the industry is positioned as
it is. The reason is that all the companies in the same industry face the same business risk
and therefore similar capital structure can be used. Because of this argument the company
has chosen to position its capital structure close to the industry average level.
7.4.2 Business risk.
The company perceives its business risk as low compared to other companies in the
industry and this affects the way the company is financed. However, the CFO commented
that the company has had problem with maintaining rental income from commercial
properties due to high vacancies and competitive rental pressure from clients as result of
an oversupply of commercial properties over the recent years. The company holds 68
percent of its total portfolio as commercial properties (Figure 7.1)
7.4.3 Financial risk
Another important factor that influences Samrand's capital structure decisions is its
current financial risk. They perceive their financial risk as lower than their competitors, a
perception based on the short term duration of loans, short term refinancing periods and
the fact that they have not used all their mortgages. The current mortgage level is 73%,
which illustrates that the further mortgage is possible.
7.4.4 Interest rate.
Samrand uses simulation when considering how changes in interest rate will affect the
company's operating profit. Another tool that is employed is sensitivity analysis, which
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reveals what will happen to the company results if interest rate rises. When the impact of
an interest rate is known, an appropriate leverage level can easily be determined.
7.4.5 Management attitude
Samrand's management also relies on historical factors when determining capital
structure. They feel it is important to keep an equity base as a buffer for future unforeseen
events and to maintain financial flexibility to be able capitalize on new opportunities.
All the above factors are taken into account when the company determines its capital
structure. However, the CFO of Samrand argues that the most important factor of all is to
follow industry trend with respect to leverage level.
Further findings about Samrand indicate that the tax rate does not influence the".
company's decision regarding capital structure. The size of the profit is also irrelevant
when they determine the capital structure since most of the company's profit will be used
for other purposes, such as paying out dividends and renovating the properties they own.
7.5 Analysis of Samrand's capital structure
The analysis takes into account several factors that need to be considered when
determining an optimal level of capital structure. These factors include:
• maximum use of the tax shield, which means using debt financing as long as the
debt burden does not constrain the company;
• practical limitation to debt financing must be investigated. For instance, does the
company have acceptable debt coverage ratio;
• business risk should be established. Knowing the level of business risk, will assist
in estimating an appropriate financial risk;
• ability to cope with current financial and future financial risk should be assessed·,
and
• determining the effect the leverage would have on WACC and shareholder value.
7.5.1 Making use oftax shield
Benefiting from the tax shield is based on the assumption that a company is making a
profit. Samrand has been making profit for the past four years, for this reason there should
be an incentive for the company to take full advantage of the tax shield. The company is
currently protecting their profit from taxes, by using the assessed loss from earlier years,
which essentially gives the same protection as debt financing. Even though there is
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assessed loss, the tax shield created by the debt financing will be saved to carry the loss
forward to a future date. This is an incentive for using debt financing. To investigate
whether their current leverage level is optimal, the analysis of business and financial risk
is undertaken. Again, we need to establish if there are any practical limitations to the
company acquiring additional debt
7.5.2 Limitation to debt financing
During the 1980's when the company was listed, South Africa was subject to economic
sanctions and the most companies faced stringent conditions on the level of debt financing
available. Today, Samrand can mortgage their properties up to 100 percent for just a few
basis points more on their interest rate. However, the current mortgage level for Samrand
is 73 percent. There are no restrictions set by the banks regarding Samrand's debt
financing level, which means that it is possible for the company to take full advantage of
tax shield by borrowing up to 100 percent mortgage level. Since there is no practical
limitation to the size of debt financing, the leverage level depends upon the company
business and finance risk.
7.5.3 Business risk
Three measures have been used to establish the company business risk: the industry
leverage, the unlevered beta and other factors that could cause variation in future
earnings. However, none of these factors alone provides a perfect measure of business
risk, but using the results from each of these measures, a good estimation of business risk
can be established.
7.5.3.1 Industry Average
Figure 4.4 shows that the real estate industry is the fourth highest levered at 60 percent
compared to other industries. According to theory, a higher leverage level in the industry
is a sign that the industry is facing a low business risk (Grundy and Ward, 1996). As the
fourth highest levered industry the real estate industry faces a low business risk.
7.5.3.2 Unlevered beta
Figure 4.2 shows business risk in terms of unlevered beta. Samrand is facing the highest
business risk compared to other companies in the industry. The high business risk
indicated by unlevered beta is due to the fact that the company holds a larger portfolio in
commercial properties, which are characterized by high market volatility.
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7. 5.3. 3Fundamentalfactors that causes variances in the future earnings.
• Focus on commercial properties. Samrand focuses on commercial properties, which
brings a higher business risk compared to residential and industrial properties.
However, the company's commercial properties are attractive because they are
located in large cities and 70 percent of their properties were built or rebuilt after
1986.
• Few larger customers. Samrand's five largest rental customer's account for 41
percent of the total amount of contracted rents and the average remaining tenant
duration for these properties is 5 years. Having properties focused on a small
number of tenant increases business risk, whereas, having the duration of 5 years
leases reduces the risk.
• Unattractive properties. The company has sold properties in less attractive areas and
focused on three potential areas including Gauteng, Kwazulu Natal and Cape
Town. According to an analysis conducted by an external consulting firm,
Samrand currently has the highest prices of commercial properties in Gauteng
compared to other companies in the industry. These fundamental factors indicate
that the company is experiencing relatively higher business risk compared to its
competitors.
7.5.4 Financial risk
Four measures to estimate financial risk have been used:
• leverage level
• interest coverage ratio
• financial beta, and
• interest rate sensitivity
7.5.4.1 leverage level
Samrand's leverage level is the same as the industry average, and financial risk from a
debt point of view can be assumed to equal to that of industry. By keeping the leverage
level at the 60 percent the company is merely exposed to financial risk that is at an
industry average.
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7.5.4.2 Interest Coverage Ratio
The company's debt coverage ration for the past four years can be seen in Table7.1.
Table 7.1 Samrand's interest coverage ratio.
Year
Interest coverage ratio
Source: Samrand annual report 2001.
1998 1999 2000 2001
0.87 0.92 1.03 1.60
For the past four years the company has experienced an interest coverage ratio below
1.25, the ratio that is acceptable as industry norm (Maisel, 1987). Although the company
has been able to obtain an interest coverage ratio in 2001 above industry norm, it still
remains slightly below industry average of 1.78. The low interest coverage ratio from past
years indicates how volatile the Samrand income is, which is attributable to volatility in
the commercial property market in which the company holds the largest of its portfolio.
The low interest coverage ratio illustrates a high financial risk, which means that
additional debt financing cannot be accessed unless the company shifts from its current
business strategy of focusing on commercial property that has been characterized by
market volatility.
7.5.4.3 Financial Beta
The company has the second largest financial beta in the industry of 0.62, only Gold-edge
has higher financial beta of 0.71, As seen in Figure 4.10, the higher financial beta indicate
higher financial risk.
7.5.4.4 Interest rate sensitivity.
The interest rate sensitivity analysis conducted by the company shows that one percentage
unit change in interest rate will cause a decline in income after interest expense by 19
percentages. Even though Samrand's interest rate sensitivity is high it compares favorably
with that of industry. Moreover, Samrand has managed to minimize the impact of interest
rate sensitivity through interest rate swaps, which resulted in a reduction in financial risk.
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7.6.5 Coping with financial risk
The company has managed to obtain an interest coverage ratio above the industry norm of
1.25. This however, might not be sustainable based on past trends. Any small change in
operating income or operating expense could alter the result from positive to negative.
According to the Samrand CFO, it has been possible to choose such a strategy of low interest
coverage due to securing low interest rates, which has been made possible by extended
. duration and swap agreements. However, the risk of change in operating income and
operating expenses still remains, and could change the interest coverage ratio to unacceptable
level.
7.7 Conclusions
7.7.1 How Samrand determines its capital structure
The conclusion regarding how Samrand determines its capital structure is that they do not use
any model outlined in Chapter three. The reason is that they are not familiar with the models
and that are inapplicable in practice according to the company. Instead of using the models,
the company takes several fundamental factors into the account. The company analyses each
fundamental factor and from these separate findings an overall picture regarding capital
structure decision is composed.
The most important fundamental factor for Samrand is the industry average leverage level.
They argue that there is a reason that the industry is positioned as it. The reason for similar
capital structures within the industry is that the companies face the same business risk, and
therefore Samrand aims to position itself close to the industry average. The company's
business risk is also an important factor when capital structure decisions are made. The
company perceives its business risk as lower than the industry average and consequently they
argue that a higher financial risk can be accepted.
7.7.2 Improvement in Samrand's Capital Structure
From the above analysis one can conclude that the company is averagely levered. This
conclusion is based on the fact that the company has managed to keep its leverage level to
that of the industry average. However, Samrand's current leverage level is considered to be
high, based on the fact that company has the highest business risk in the industry even though
the company management perceives its business risk to be low. The reasons for concluding
that the company has a high business risk is its high-unlevered beta, which is the result of the
company strategy of focusing on commercial properties.
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Again the company has high financial risk, low interest coverage ratio and high interest
sensitivity. Despite, interest rate swaps and extended duration on loans, all tactics which
have been used to reduce the company income volatility, the overall trend with respect to
interest rate sensitivity and interest coverage ratio are not satisfactory. Samrand is
inappropriately positioned as it has a poor combination of both business risk and financial
risk as indicated by unlevered beta and financial beta.
One can therefore conclude that, the company's current capital structure is not optimal
and changes should be made.
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: OVERALL CONCLUSION
This chapter will present the overall conclusion regarding how the case companies
determine their capital structure and if their current capital structures are optimal or if
they could be improved.
The findings indicate that none of the compames uses a mathematical model when
deciding their capital structure. Neither have they estimated their bankruptcy costs, which
is necessary for using of the Trade-Off Model. One can conclude that no theoretical
models are used as a basis for capital structure decisions.
However, Gold-edge seems to follow the Trade-Off Model unintentionally. The analysis
indicates that they have reached the trade-off point, where adding extra debt will put the
company in financial distress. Instead of using theoretical models, all three case
companies use certain important key factors as guidelines when determining capital
structure. Even though, there are individual variations concerning key factors, a common
pattern can be noted. History is the one factor all case companies consider very important
when their capital structure decisions are made. From an optimal structure point of view,
one could argue that this logic is questionable, since decisions should be based on current
data and not historical data. Another interesting finding is that none of the companies has
used unlevered beta when estimating their business risk. Evaluation of the case
companies' business risk found that a huge variation exist between the companies'
unlevered beta and their perception of their business risk.
All three case companies have perceived their business risk as lower than the industry
average, and it was proved to be correct only in the case of Gold-edge. It seems that these
case companies have underestimated their business risk, or it may be the result of wanting
to present the company in favourable light in the interview. Nevertheless, the overall
findings support the assertion that the actual business risk is higher than the companies'
perceived it but lower than the unlevered beta indicates.
Another finding is that tradition in the real estate industry plays an important role in the
capital structure decision process, a trend that was observed in all three case companies.
Gold-edge has always been highly levered company, whereas Putprop has been a strong
equity-based company something they both use as a guideline when they determine future
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capital structure. Samrand, on the other hand, has always tried to reach an industry
average, which they use as guideline when determining capital structure.
A final remark concerning how the case companies have decided their capital structure is
that their decisions do not get the attention it deserves. It seems that their decisions are
based on intuition rather than a clear analysis.
The analysis of the case companies' capital structure indicates that Putprop's capital
structure is inappropriately positioned, due to their higher than average business risk in
combination with their exceptionally low leverage. The business risk is based on the high-
unlevered beta and the fundamental factors.
Based on the analysis, Putprop's financial risk is extremely low, due to high interest
coverage ratio, the low interest sensitivity, and the fact that it is the least levered company
in the real estate industry. This combination of business and financial risk would allow the
company to increase leverage level in order to reach an appropriate position, according to
Figure 3.4. Another argument for increasing leverage level is that the Trade-Off Model is
not followed since they do not make maximum use of the tax shield.
To conclude, a more appropriate capital structure for Putprop can be reached in three
ways: by increasing leverage level of2% to 60%, which is industry average level or
by increasing debt financing to the extent of maintaining an interest coverage ratio of
1.25, the level accepted by banks (Maisal, 1987) or interest coverage ratio of 1.78 which
is an industry average. Under the latter two alternatives, debt financing will increase
which will present the company with an opportunity to exploit tax advantage and thereby
reducing the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which in turn will increase
theoretical value of the firm.
Gold-edge, on the other hand, is appropriately positioned due to their very low business
risk and high leverage. This combination is considered an optimal, according to Figure
3.4. The low business risk is derived from low unlevered beta, which is further
strengthened by fundamental factors. Their financial risk is based on low debt coverage
ratio, extremely high interest rate sensitivity and the fact that it is the highest levered
company in the industry. The fact that Gold-edge makes a maximum use of the tax shield,
without putting the company in a financial distress, further emphases that according to the
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Trade-Off Theory they are close to an optimal capital structure. The interest coverage
ratio shows that the leverage level cannot further be increased. However, it is possible to
maintain the current leverage level due to Gold-edge's strategies for coping with financial
risk. To conclude, Gold-edge's current capital structure of 88 percent is considered as
close to optimal as possible.
Samrand's capital structure is not optimal, based on two arguments. Firstly, it is
inappropriately positioned according to Figure 3.4. This is due to the company's high
business risk and high financial risk. The business risk is derived from its high-unlevered
beta and its strong focus on commercial properties. The perception of Samrand's
relatively high financial risk is due to the fact that is has the second largest financial beta
in the industry which is more than three times as much as that of industry average of 0.19.
Similarly, the company has interest coverage ratio, which is below that of industry. It has,
however, leverage a level that is at an industry average.
The combination of the company's business risk and financial risk places it far away from
the appropriate position according to Figure 3.4.
It is reasonable to argue that the current leverage level is inappropriate, even though the
present cash flow is large enough to cover fixed interest expense, it is not sustainable as
indicated by the low interest coverage trend. The company will need to revise its
investment strategy and change from focusing on commercial property to having a more
balanced investment to reduce the high business risk inherent in commercial properties.
Even though lowering leverage would decrease the financial risk, it will make less use of
the tax shield, and lowering the value of the firm. However, if the current investment
strategy were maintained, a reduction in leverage level would be justified to maintain a
proper balance between business and financial risk, which in return would reduce
financial risk and increase the value of the firm. One can conclude therefore that, the
company current capital structure is not optimal and change should be made.
8.1 Suggestion for further research
It was very surprising that this study found that theoretical models are totally inapplicable
in practice. This is due to the fact that the models failed to take into account many
important factors. These models were supposed to calculate the optimal capital structure
without considering profitability, tangibility of assets, or growth amongst others.
Currently the appealing theoretical model for estimating optimal capital structure is Static
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Trade-off Model, but as Myers and Majluf stated in 1984, there are several factors that the
model cannot explain. This therefore leads us to an important research area for the
development of model that is much better than existing ones, especially for the real estate
industry. The reason is that the companies in the real estate industry are fairly similar
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10. APPENDICES
10.1. Appendix I
AGENCY COST OF EQUITY
Assume that there is a firm that is 100% owned by a single entrepreneur. He is both the
owner and manager (a-M). For the action the a-M bears all the benefit or the full cost.
For example, if the manager takes one day off, he bears the full cost of doing this. The O-
M also benefits in full from all works he does, and he will take every possible action to
increase his own wealth. However, if a portion of the company is sold by external equity
to new shareholders, the a-M is co- owner, and no longer bears either all the benefit or
the full cost of his actions. When a fraction of the company is sold, entrepreneur only
bears his remaining proportion of the consequences of his actions. Since the entrepreneur
no longer bears the full cost of his actions, there is an incentive for him to engage in
perquisites (e.g. buy a corporate jet). When a fraction of company was sold, the
entrepreneur reduced his cost of engaging in "perk" activities. He no longer bears the
fully costs of perks, but he can benefit fully from the perk activities. The entrepreneur has
lowered the cost of perk activities. But in an efficient market, investors are aware of this
behaviour of entrepreneurs and its reflected in stock prices. Consequently, when a fraction
of a company is sold, the stock price wiII be reduced. The stock prices will reflect perks,
so one can say even if a fraction of a firm is sold, the entrepreneur will still bear the full
costs of perks. By this behavior society is harmed and suffers a cost of equity and a
reduction in the value of assets (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)
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If the company decides to choose debt financing instead of external equity, the
entrepreneur is still the sole owner, and will benefit full from action taken. When issuing
external equity the extra cash flow has to be shared with other owners, whereas, in the
case of a sole proprietor the full cash flow after interest is retained. In other words, one is
expected to work harder when the firm is financed with debt rather than with equity.
Shirking is more common when equity is issued (Ross and Westerfiel and Jaffe, 1993). A
key to the mechanism that the shareholders use to reduce the agency cost of equity is to
monitor the action of mangers by appointing a board of directors and an independent
auditor. However, in so doing, monitoring costs are incurred which can also be viewed as
agency cost of equity.
10.2 Appendix IT
AGENCY COST OF DEBT
It is possible for bondholders/lenders to be fooled or misled by managers. For example,
management might raise money from bondholders saying that it is a low risk lending (and
therefore pay low interest rate) because the firm has low leverage/gearing and the funds
will be used for low-risk projects. In the event that managers invest in higher risk
ventures, and the firms becomes more highly levered/geared by borrowing more, the
original bondholders/lenders do not receive a return equal to the level of risk and the firm
has the benefit oflow-interest financing.
Alternatively, consider a firm already in financial distress. From the shareholders' point
of view there is little to lose by taking an enormous gamble by accepting a very high-risk
projects. If the gamble pays off, managers will win but the debt holders will gain no more
than the obliged fixed interest. If it fails, the shareholders are no worse off but the
bondholders/lenders experience default on their securities. One of the solutions to reduce
the agency cost of debt is to spend money on monitoring. The lender will require a
premium on the debt interest to compensate for this additional cost. Also restrictions
(covenants) are usually built into lending agreement. For example, there may be limits on
the level of dividends so that shareholders do not strip the company of cash. There may be
limits placed on the overall level of indebtedness, with precise capital and income-
leverage ratios. Managers may be restricted in the disposal of major assets or constrained
in the activity they may engage in.
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Extensive covenants imposed by lenders can be costly for shareholders because they
reduce the firm's operating freedom and investment flexibility. Thus agency costs,
include monitoring costs, which are passed on as higher interest rates and a loss of value
caused by the inhibition of managerial freedom to act. The lost efficiency plus monitoring
costs are agency costs that increase the cost of debt and thus reduce its advantage.
10.3. Appendix III
FORMULA FOR THE KEY RATIOS FOUND IN APPENDIX VI
Earning before interest and taxes




Total debt +shareholders' funds
Debt/Equity ratio = Total debt
Total equity
Equity/debt ratio = Total equity
Total debt
Asset beta (~A) = E X ~E + D X ~D
D (l-T) +E D (l-T) +E
OR
I
Asset beta (~A) = E X ~E (if beta of debt mD), is zero)
D (l-T) +E
Financial beta = Equity beta mE) - Asset beta (~A)
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10.4. Appendix IV
SUMMARY OF KEY RATIOS FROM SELECTED INDUSTRIES
(refer Appendix vi, page 89)
INDUSTRIES LEVERAGE EQillTYBETA ASSET BETA FINANCIAL BETA
BANKS 0.84 0.77 0.55 0.22
TRANSPORT 0.56 0.72 0.48 0.24
CONSTRUCTION & BUILDING 0.25 0.54 0.43 0.11
MINING 0.36 0.77 0.53 0.24
ELECTRONICS & ELECTRICITY 0.39 0.80 0.68 0.12
FOOD 0.30 0.49 0.39 0.10
INFORMAnON TECHNOLOGY 0.65 1.22 0.87 0.35
RETAIL 0.36 0.64 0.53 0.11
FINANCIAL SERVICES 0.78 0.78 0.38 0.40
REAL ESTATES 0.60 0.39 0.22 0.17
SOFTWARE 0.12 1.20 1.01 0.16
Source: JSE Profile's Handbook, 2002
Cadiz Stock Broking Quantitative research, 2001
10.5 Appendix V
INTEREST COVERAGE RATIOS TABLE
EARNING BEFORE INTEREST INTEREST COVERAGE
COMPANY INTEREST CHARGE AND TAX RATIOS
PUTPROP 1,080 18,900 17.40
BONATLA 61,893 17,890 1.20
LIB-INT 2,467,660 61,893 2.20
PREMOGRO 83,863 3,316,075 1.10
PANPROP 79,859 84,263 1.70
CONFED 1,098 4,500 4.10
!PROP 40,755 46,050 1.13
MARSHALLS 2,704 5,400 2.18
SAMRAND 20,969 33,536 1.60
GOODCAPE 1,690 4,000 2.40
GOLD-EDGE 6,058 7,552 1.25
CHARAND 12,051 9,952 0.82
Source. Annual Reports, 200 I of compames lIsted above
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lO.6.Appendix VI
KEY RAnos FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES IN JSE FOR FISCAL YEAR
01/04/2001 TO 30103/2002
(All data afrom JSE Profile's Handbook, 2001 and Cadiz Stock Broking Research, 2001)
BANKING INDUSTRY
Company Name Assets Debt Equity D(l-Te) D(I-Te)+E
ABSA 247300 231965 15335 162375.5 177710.5
BOE 67236 60834 6402 42583.8 48985.8 9.50 0.90 0.11 1.07 0.93 0.14
FIRST RAND 325531 124372 201159 87060.4 288219.4 0.62 0.38 1.62 1.12 0.34 0.78
MERCANTILE 3912909 3376253 536656 2363377.1 2900033.1 6.29 0.86 0.16 0.79 0.64 0.15
NEDCOR 197691 182843 14848 127990.1 142838.1 12.31 0.92 0.08 0.86 0.77 0.09
RMBH 12648 2363 10285 1654.1 11939.1 0.23 0.19 4.35 1.18 0.16 1.02
STANBANK 395813 369767 26046 258836.9 284882.9 14.20 0.93 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.00






Company Name Assets Debt Equity D(I-Tc) D(l-Tc)+E I!?/ES Leve .beta a~ ....... ·n".
UNITRANS 1087289 184576 902713 129203 1031916 0.20 0.17 4.89 0.54 0.47 0.07
VALUE 260816 122675 138141 85873 224014 0.89 0.47 1.13 0.96 0.59 0.37
TRENCOR 9140012 6816112 2323900 4771278 7095178 2.93 0.75 0.34 1.0 I 0.33 0.68
SUPRGRP 1982835 806284 1176551 564399 1740950 0.69 0.41 1.46 0.15 0.10 0.05
PUTCO 207000 62600 144400 43820 188220 0.43 0.30 2.31 0.65 0.50 0.15
MILLAIR 66537 46881 19656 32817 52473 2.39 0.70 0.42 0.81 0.30 0.51
MOBILE 1292622 189148 1103474 132404 1235878 0.17 0.15 5.83 0.94 0.84 0.10
LASER 126784 0 126784 0 126784 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.96 0.00
GRINDROD 1263655 544067 719588 380847 1100435 0.76 0.43 1.32 0.68 0.44 0.24
CARGO 160201 46245 113956 32372 146328 0.41 0.29 2.46 0.01 0.01 0.00
AVIS 2095955 1083080 1012875 758156 1771031 1.07 0.52 0.94 1.00 0.57 0.43
COMAlR 581026 212405 368621 148684 517305 0.58 0.37 1.74 0.96 0.68 0.28
Grand total 18264732 10114073 8150659 7079851 15230510 10.51 4.55 22.83 8.67 5.81 2.86
Average ~j24,,·O:S~'9:22 '&&• ?,24;"+"IJ(1-Tc) 0.70
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
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Company Name Assets Debt Equity D(l-Tc) D(I-Tc)+E
AFGLASS 345427 40847 304580 28593 333173 0.13 0.\2 7.46 0.00 0.00
AVENG 3277900 954900 2323000 668430 2991430 0.41 0.29 2.43 0.50 0.39 0.11
BASREAD 116288 96599 19689 67619 87308 4.91 0.83 0.20 0.55 0.12 0.43
CASHBUILD 88764 6904 81860 4833 86693 0.08 0.08 11.86 0.47 0.44 0.03
CEMENCO 62281 36385 25896 25470 51366 1.41 0.58 0.71 0.62 0.31 0.31
CERAMIC 379409 16340 363069 11438 374507 0.05 0.04 22.22 0.54 0.52 0.02
CONCOR 221048 69854 151194 48898 200092 0.46 0.32 2.16 0.64 0.48 0.16
DAWN 141846 25012 116834 17508 134342 0.21 0.18 4.67 0.50 0.43 0.07
ELB 498544 95663 402881 66964 469845 0.24 0.19 4.21 0.08 0.07 0.01
GROUP5 449567 84968 364599 59478 424077 0.23 0.19 4.29 0.74 0.64 0.10
o...LlAD 97616 1048 96568 734 97302 0.01 0.01 92.15 0.09 0.09 0.00
ITLTILE 274135 7367 266768 5157 271925 0.03 0.03 36.21 0.49 0.48 0.01
MASONITE 127073 18226 108847 12758 121605 0.17 0.14 5.97 0.41 0.37 0.04
M&R-HLD 3193 716 2477 501 2978 0.29 0.22 3.46 0.84 0.70 0.14
T1LEAFRIK 70862 1002 69860 701 70561 0.01 0.01 69.72 0.00 0.00
WDHO 361539 72828 288711 50980 339691 0.25 0.20 3.96 1.10 0.93 0.17
PPC 2628000 763400 1864600 534380 2398980 0.41 0.29 2.44 0.56 0.44 0.12
Grand total 9143492 2292059 6851433 1604441 8455874 9.30 3.73 274.13 8.13 6.42 1.71
Average































Assets Debt Eqnity D(l-Tc) D(l-Te)+E
15788 3266 12522 2286.2 14808.2 0.26 0.21 3.83 1.40
19264 5838 13426 4086.6 17512.6 0.43 0.30 2.30 1.48
26277 13457 12820 9419.9 22239.9 1.05 0.51 0.95 0.78
6205 3913 2292 2739.1 5031.1 17 I 0.63 0.59 0.99
2 I 64278 328806 1835472 230 I 64.2 2065636.2 0.\8 0.15 5.58 0.99
1343454163969 1179485 114778.3 1294263.3 0.140.12 7.19 0.60
2933642 733856 2199786 513699.2 2713485.2 0.33 0.25 3.00
176555 29603 146952 20722.1 167674.1 0.200.17 4.96 0.59
23575 11396 12179 7977.2 20156.2 0.940.48 1.07 1.18
1055255 621869 433386 435308.3 868694.3 1.43 0.59 0.70 0.47
4570 2082 2488 1457.4 3945.4 0.84 0.46 1.20 0.58
7817178 2892824 4924354 2024976.8 6949330.8 0.59 0.37 170
8950300155620073941001089340 8483440 0.210.17 4.75 1.08
1876971 36430 1840541 25501 1866042 0.02 0.02 50.52 0.80
179924 12283 167641 8598.1 176239.1 0.07 0.07 13.65 0.40
7343000 3109000 4234000 2 I 76300 6410300 0.73 0.42 1.36
930000 273000 657000 191100 848100 0.42 0.29 2.41 0.79
23506 15792 7714 11054.4 18768.4 2.05 0.67 0.49 0.23
361002 284023 76979 198816.1 275795.1 3.69 0.79 0.27 0.45
550839 3195\6 231323 223661.2 454984.2 1.38 0.58 0.72 0.91
4280428 2487695 1792733 1741386.5 3534119.5 1.39 0.58 0.72 0.91
1114855 922108 192747 645475.6 838222.6 4.78 0.83 0.21 1.24
191858 I 136628 1781953 95639.6 1877592.6 0.08 0.07 13.04 1.24
15706300 6537200 9169100 4576040 13745140 0.71 0.42 1.40 0.68





























ELECTRONIC AND ELECTRIC INDUSTRY
0.7I-Tc
'~!:;itJJ~EqUi~~iuaU:~~~,'!J
Company Name Assets Debt Equity D(1-Tc) D(l-Tc)+E iA .i:i beta beta '"
ALTRON 4616470 2671395 1945075 1869976.5 3815051.5 1.37 0.58 0.73 0.62 0.32 0.30
ALTECH 972982 57641 915341 40348.7 955689.7 0.06 0.06 15.88 0.89 0.85 0.04
BrCAF 779000 220000 559000 154000 713000 0.39 0.28 2.54 0.34 0.27 0.07
CONTROL 86354 14296 72058 10007.2 82065.2 0.20 0.17 5.04 0.34 0.30 0.04
DELTA 721460 21128 700332 14789.6 715121.6 0.03 0.03 33.15 0.96 0.94 0.02
DGICOR 102664 854 101810 597.8 102407.8 0.01 0.01 119.22 0.96 0.95 0.01
GRINTEK 460471 88125 372346 61687.5 434033.5 0.24 0.19 4.23 1.27 1.09 0.18
JASCO 30182 84 30098 58.8 30156.8 0.00 0.00 358.31 0.00 0.00
SETHOLD 46833 14579 32254 10205.3 42459.3 0.45 0.31 2.21 0.99 0.75 0.24
STELLA 29452 10656 18796 7459.2 26255.2 0.57 0.36 1.76 0.00 0.00





Company Name Assets Debt Eqnity D(l-Tc) D(l-Tc)+E
~~~WD;~!;r~~:t:nc.:;
ALL-JOY 4744 277 4467 193.9 4660.9 0.06 0.06 16.13 -D.03 -0.03 0.00
A-V-J 3416 930 2486 651 3137 0.37 0.27 2.67 0.47 0.37 0.10
ASTRAL 520724 101298 419426 70908.6 490334.6 0.24 0.19 4.14 0.27 0.23 0.04
CONAFEX 21441 3066 18375 2146.2 20521.2 0.17 0.14 5.99 -D.47 -D.42 -0.05
CROOKES 248445 46149 202296 32304.3 234600.3 0.23 0.19 4.38 0.4 0.34 0.06
HLH 2164759 398559 1766200 278991.3 2045191.3 0.23 0.18 4.43 0.64 0.55 0.09
ILLOVO 4161600 2375300 1786300 1662710 3449010 1.33 0.57 0.75 0.71 0.37 0.34
INTRADING 65390 960 64430 672 65102 0.01 0.0\ 67.11 0.68 0.67 0.01
KOLOSUS 194783 28371 166412 19859.7 186271.7 0.\7 0.15 5.87 0.92 0.82 0.10
NAMF1SH 173656 38763 134893 27134.1 162027.1 0.29 0.22 3.48 0.45 0.37 0.08
NAMSEA 38647 3459 35188 2421.3 37609.3 0.10 0.09 10.17 0.1 0.09 om
OTK 1467592 81772 1385820 57240.4 1443060.4 0.06 0.06 16.95 0.7 0.67 0.03
OCEANA 605607 20329 585278 14230.3 599508.3 0.03 0.03 28.79 0.27 0.26 0.01
RAIBOW 897199 39899 857300 27929.3 885229.3 0.05 0.04 21.49 0.8 0.77 0.03
SOVFOOD 150465 60019 90446 42013.3 132459.3 0.66 0.40 1.51 0.48 0.33 0.15
TONGAAT 7044 2655 4389 1858.5 6247.5 0.60 0.38 1.65 0.77 0.54 0.23
T1GBRAND 5340 3254 2086 2277.8 4363.8 1.56 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.32 0.35
Grand Total 10730852 3205060 7525792 2243542 9769334 6.17 3.60 196.16 7.83 6.28 1.55





Company Name Assets Debt Equit)' D(l-Te) D(l-Te)+E DIE .i·· KIIL .v' :_ 1//: .
APLITEC 362,290 4,829 357,461 3,380 360,84\ 0.0\ om 74.02 1.81 1.79 0.02
MAXTEC 20,590 137 20,453 96 20,549 0.01 om 149.29 0.92 0.92 0.00
MUSTEK 638,466 279,855 358,611 195,899 554,510 0.78 0.44 1.28 0.89 0.58 0.31
AST-GROUP 744,481 175,833 568,648 123,083 691,731 0.31 0.24 3.23 1.41 1.16 0.25
BTG 763,360 176,589 586,771 123,612 710,383 0.30 0.23 3.32 1.36 1.12 0.24
COMPAREX 4,29\,900 820,300 3,471,600 574,2\0 4,045,810 0.24 0.\9 4.23 0.91 0.78 0.13
COMPCLEAR 29,699 574 29,125 402 29,527 0.02 0.02 50.74 1.14 1.12 0.02
CONNECT 52,291 0 52,291 0 52,291 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.03 1.03 0.00
CRUX 17,794 0 17,794 0 17,794 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.65 -0.65 0.00
CSH \77,783 20,\59 \57,624 \4,\11 171,735 0.13 0.11 7.82 0.85 0.78 0.07
DATATECH 3,883,000 3,490,500 392,500 2,443,350 2,835,850 8.89 0.90 0.11 1.7 0.24 1.46
DCENTRIX 125,735 6,390 119,345 4,473 123,818 0.05 0.05 18.68 1.47 1.42 0.05
DIDATA 2,591,088 0 2,591,088 0 2,591,088 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.27 1.27 0.00
FARlTECH 87,933 649 87,284 454 87,738 0.01 0.01 134.49 0.81 0.8\ 0.00
GLOTECH 504,646 50,242 454,404 35,169 489,573 0.11 0.10 9.04 1.24 1.15 0.09
HlCORL 27,143 26,384 759 18,469 19,228 34.76 0.97 0.03 1.34 0.05 1.29
IDrON 255,412 23,868 231,544 16,708 248,252 0.10 0.09 9.70 1.2 1.12 0.08
INTERVlD 650,677 389,504 261,173 272,653 533,826 1.49 0.60 0.67 2.64 1.29 1.35
MAXTECH 20,590 137 20,453 96 20,549 0.01 0.01 149.29 0.37 0.37 0.00
MGX 612,752 83,139 529,613 58,197 587,810 0.16 0.14 6.37 0.92 0.83 0.09
OSI 17,074 2,317 14,757 1,622 16,379 0.16 0.14 6.37 1.64 1.48 0.16
SPESCOM 113,342 91,861 21,481 64,303 85,784 4.28 0.81 0.23 0.17 0.04 0.13
UCS 187,701 486 187,215 340 187,555 0.00 0.00 385.22 1.\3 1.\3 0.00
VESTA 19,34\ 309 19,032 216 19,248 0.02 0.02 61.59 1.27 1.26 0.01
PINNACLE 79168 12,251 66917 8,576 75,493 0.18 0.15 5.46 0.81 0.72 0.09
Grand Total 16,274,256 5,656,313 10,617,943 14,577,362 52.01 5.23 1081.20 28 21.79 5.86
Average ~,53i;~:j;1""-- 0.87-'"Pie} ",YW ,Hf0?
RETAIL INDUSTRY
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Company Name Assets Debt Equity D(1-Te) D(l-Te)+E
WOOLIES 3999100 1627900 2371200 1139530 3510730 0.69 0.41 1.46 0.00 0.00
TRADEH 209241 23653 185588 16557.1 202145.1 0.13 0.11 7.85 0.8 0.73 0.07
TRUWHTS 3061800 602300 2459500 421610 2881110 0.24 0.20 4.08 0.84 0.72 0.12
RELYANT 2690300 348500 2341800 243950 2585750 0.15 0.13 6.72 0.38 0.34 0.04
RAG 2234352 532648 1701704 372853.6 2074557.6 0.31 0.24 3.19 0.47 0.39 0.08
REX-TRUE 1107900 153400 954500 107380 1061880 0.16 0.14 6.22 1.39 1.25 0.14
PEPKOR 1081813 470974 610839 329681.8 940520.8 0.77 0.44 1.30 0.5 0.32 0.18
PROFURN 429769 152348 277421 106643.6 384064.6 0.55 0.35 1.82 0.00 0.00
NUCLICK 161349 280 161069 196 161265 0.00 0.00 575.25 1.14 1.14 0.00
N1CTUS 1286879 75270 1211609 52689 1264298 0.06 0.06 16.10 0.93 0.89 0.04
MASSMART 1919520 230910 1688610 161637 1850247 0.14 0.12 7.31 0.4 0.37 0.03
METJE 1339114 181305 1157809 126913.5 1284722.5 0.16 0.14 6.39 0.27 0.24 0.03
METCASH 32974 2425 30549 1697.5 32246.5 0.08 0.07 12.60 0.00 0.00
LA GROUP 1747600 371500 1376100 260050 1636150 0.27 0.21 3.70 1.14 0.96 0.18
HNCHOlCE 51110 1531 49579 1071.7 50650.7 0.03 0.03 32.38 -0.3 -0.29 -0.01
FOSCH1N1 3391 2090 1301 1463 2764 1.61 0.62 0.62 0.00 0.00
EDCON 249227 10621 238606 7434.7 246040.7 0.04 0.04 22.47 1.14 1.11 0.03
MRPRICE 325909 26339 299570 18437.3 318007.3 0.09 0.08 11.37 0.92 0.87 0.05
MIDAS 171363 299 171064 209.3 171273.3 0.00 0.00 572.12 0.14 0.14 0.00
NICTUS 32974 0 32974 0 32974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00
PICKNPAY 1921400 643400 1278000 450380 1728380 0.50 0.33 1.99 0.4 0.30 0.10
SHORPRIT 6592818 5222324 1370494 3655626.8 5026120.8 3.81 0.79 0.26 0.88 0.24 0.64
TILEAFRIK 70862 1002 69860 701.4 70561.4 0.01 0.01 69.72 0.48 0.48 0.00
VALCAR 50048 31090 18958 21763 40721 1.64 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.30 0.34
WESTCOR 4383945 2047124 2336821 1432986.8 3769807.8 0.88 0.47 1.14 0.11 0.07 0.04
WOOLTRU 3516800 617300 2899500 432110 3331610 0.21 0.18 4.70 1.3 1.13 0.17
WOOLTRU-N 4299100 1927900 2371200 1349530 3720730 0.81 0.45 1.23 0.8 0.51 0.29






Company Name Assets Debt Eqnity D(I-Tc) D(1-Tc)+E ~~::~
T1SEC 127233 57373 69860 40161.1 110021.1 0.82 0.45 1.22 0.97 0.62 0.35
SASFIN 1100955 940000 160955 658000 818955 5.84 0.85 0.17 1.15 0.23 0.92
PERGRIN 25227 18597 6630 13017.9 19647.9 2.80 0.74 0.36 0.00 0.00
PROPER 1245967 13084 1232883 9158.8 1242041.8 0.01 0.01 94.23 1.2 1.19 0.01
PSG 15824 7600 8224 5320 13544 0.92 0.48 1.08 1.2 0.73 0.47
PSGBANKH 1100955 947716 153239 663401.2 816640.2 6.18 0.86 0.16 1.68 0.32 1.36
NffiH 156009 110366 45643 77256.2 122899.2 2.42 0.71 0.41 1.09 0.40 0.69
METfLE 387733 39893 347840 27925.1 375765.1 0.11 0.10 8.72 0.00 0.00
JDGROUP 22135 11210 10925 7847 18772 1.03 0.51 0.97 0.65 0.38 0.27
IDION 4477100 3259100 1218000 2281370 3499370 2.68 0.73 0.37 0.00 0.00
INCENT 3341513 1751624 1589889 1226136.8 2816025.8 1.10 0.52 0.91 0.00 0.00
INDEQTY 30242000 26931000 3311000 18851700 22162700 8.13 0.89 0.12 1.05 0.16 0.89
INVESTEC 412024 80266 331758 56186.2 387944.2 0.24 0.19 4.13 0.00 0.00
UNIFER 3548 1502 2046 1051.4 3097.4 0.73 0.42 1.36 0.00 0.00
TIGON 1359346 113379 1245967 79365.3 1325332.3 0.09 0.08 10.99 1.1 1.03 0.07
SOLUTIONS 64740 58730 6010 41111 47121 9.77 0.91 0.10 0.97 0.12 0.85
CADIZ 461418 211108 250310 147775.6 398085.6 0.84 0.46 1.19 1.36 0.86 0.50
Grand Total 44543727 34552548 9991179 24186784 34177962.6 43.74 8.92 126.50 12.42 6.03 6.39
Average 3.46 >0:#8 :EE 0.19L.'f'. 0.78/' 0.38 '0.40,'),'''"....,.""".
REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY
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Company Assets Equity Debt D(l-Te) D(l-Te)+E
APEXHI-A 1,593,575 186018 1407557 985290 1171308 0.88 7.57 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.25
A-PROP 791,084 244573 546511 382558 627131 0.69 2.23 0.45 0.10 0.04 0.06
ATLAS 698,611 89650 608961 426273 515923 0.87 6.79 0.15 0.07 0.01 0.06
GROWPNT 1,768,756 1155084 613672 429570 1584654 0.35 0.53 1.88 0.28 0.20 0.08
HYPROP 707,310 242262 535235 374665 616927 0.76 2.21 0.45 0.21 0.08 0.13
METPROL 956,038 524554 431484 302039 826593 0.45 0.82 1.22 0.42 0.27 0.15
OCTODEC 612,286 265054 347232 243062 508116 0.57 1.31 0.76 0.41 0.21 0.20
PRIMEGRO 2,305,462 299817 2005645 1403952 1703769 0.87 6.69 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.07
RLSPROPS 414,188 106554 307634 215344 321898 0.74 2.89 0.35 0.19 0.06 0.13
SABLE 143,21 J 90950 52261 36583 127533 0.36 0.57 1.74 0.72 0.51 0.21
SPEARHD 359,840 175224 184616 129231 304455 0.51 1.05 0.95 0.13 0.07 0.06
RICHWAY 1,137,986 401406 736580 515606 917012 0.65 1.83 0.54 0.16 0.07 0.09
BONATLA 662324 169407 492917 345042 514449 0.74 2.91 0.34 0.45 0.15 0.30
CHARAND 304317 167369 136948 95864 263233 0.45 0.82 1.22 0.41 0.20 0.21
CONFED 52346 48575 3771 2640 51215 0.07 0.08 12.88 0.11 0.10 0.01
GOLDEDGE 57913 6076 51104 35773 41849 0.88 8.41 0.12 0.83 0.12 0.71
GOODCAPE 29800 15289 14511 10158 25447 0.49 0.95 1.05 0.63 0.38 0.25
IPROP 470160 237758 232402 162681 400439 0.49 0.98 1.02 0.96 0.57 0.39
LIBINT 4186000 2398700 1787300 1251110 3649810 0.43 0.75 1.34 0.19 0.12 0.07
MARSHALLS 108246 72004 36242 25369 97373 0.33 0.50 1.99 0.32 0.24 0.08
PANPROP 852698 471172 381526 267068 738240 0.45 0.81 1.23 0.09 0.06 0.03
PUTPROP 136300 133100 3200 2240 135340 0.02 0.02 41.59 0.72 0.71 0.01
SAMRAND 166803 66677 100126 70088 136756 0.60 1.50 0.67 J.J9 0.76 0.62




SOFTWARE AND COMPUTER INDUSTRY
0.7I Tc
MR;;:,· ".IY :::~~;:~Company Name Assets Debt J:quity D(l-Tc) D(1-Tc)+E ~~,~s; !-ever ~
SQONE 187701 2463 185238 1724.1 186962.1 0.01 0.0 I 0.0 I 1.36 1.35 0.01
SYNERGY 19341 309 19032 216.3 19248.3 0.19 0.02 0.02 1.13 1.12 0.01
PCN 2522 29 2493 20.3 2513.3 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
PRISM 543237 36 543201 25.2 543226.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 113342 93563 19779 65494.1 85273.1 5.67 0.83 4.73 1.37 0.32 1.05
MBTECH 7598 3155 4443 2208.5 6651.5 3.96 0.42 0.71 1.64 1.10 0.54
MGX 3412 114 3298 79.8 3377.8 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.92 0.90 0.02
INFOWAVE 178847 8638 170209 6046.6 176255.6 0.05 0.05 0.05 1.2 1.16 0.04
INTERVID 337002 61283 275719 42898.1 318617.1 0.29 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.00
1ST 17074 2317 14757 1621.9 16378.9 0.16 0.14 0.16 2.64 2.38 0.26
FRONTRANGE 404003 29996 374007 20997.2 395004.2 0.40 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00
GLOTEC 612752 85193 527559 59635.1 587194.1 0.64 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.00
EC HOLD 11325 313 11012 219.1 11231.1 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.45 0.44 om
EOH 650677 84238 566439 58966.6 625405.6 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.00
DATATEC 116559 8164 108395 5714.8 114109.8 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.48 0.46 0.02
DlMENSION DATA 278138 34587 243551 24210.9 267761.9 0.14 0.12 0.14 1.7 1.55 0.15
COMPAREX 504646 78848 425798 55193.6 480991.6 0.16 0.16 0.19 1.47 1.30 0.17
BTG 70134 16835 53299 11784.5 65083.5 0.32 0.24 0.32 1.36 1.11 0.25
AST 39041 1861 37180 1302.7 38482.7 0.05 0.05 0.05 1.02 0.99 0.03
Grand Total 4097351 511942 3585409 358359.4 3943768.4 12.77 2.69 7.13 16.74 14.16 2.58




The summary of information questions that were used to guide the experience survey are as
follows:
Point one-four (question 1-4)
1 Rank the following sources oflong-term financing in order ofpreference for financing new
investment.






2 Given an attractive new growth opportunity that could not be taken with out departing from
your target capital structure or financing hierarchy, cutting the dividends, or selling ofassets,
what action is your firm most likely to take?
Courses ofaction:
Deviate from target capital structure or financing hierarchy
Forgo the growth opportunity
Sell off other assets
Cut the dividend
3 Indicate the relative importance of the following factors in governing your firm's financing
decision
Projected cash flow from asset to be financed
Risk of asset to be financed
Restrictive covenants on senior securities
Avoiding dilution of common shareholders' claim
Corporate tax rate
Voting control
Depreciation and non other tax shield
Bankruptcy costs
101
4.In your opinion, the debt ratio ofyour firm depends on ...
Disagree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Past profit
Average debt ratio in your industry
Past growth
Degree of diversification achieved by your firm
Past dividend payout
Point five 0-4)
1. Would you please explain what procedures/ rules/ models you use when establishing optimal
capital structure?
2.Are you aware of any models/formulae that are supposed to help in establishing optimal
capital structure. Ifyou have knowledge ofthose models to what extent do you apply them?
3.Given the current capital structure ofyour company, would your explain is optimal or not?
Can you justifY your answer?
4.In your opinion can you single out the most important factor that is central to the capital
structure decision process ofyour company?
